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This thesis analyzes the state of civil-military relations and militarization in El Salvador 
under the leadership of President Mauricio Funes (2009–2014). Civil-military relations 
are examined using the Center for Civil-Military Relations “trinity” framework—first 
proposed by Thomas C. Bruneau in the journal Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad in 
2005—which considers effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic civilian control. 
Militarization is presented in terms of Salvadoran troops in the streets. This thesis 
presents the linkage of these two phenomena as domestic security policy formation and 
implementation. The analysis demonstrates that informal civil-military relations have 
resulted in a largely undemocratic response to El Salvador’s sizeable security challenges. 
Two cases, in particular, are studied more closely: 1) President Funes’ unique 
relationship with General David Munguía Payés and 2) the government’s secret design of 
the 2012 gang truce. This thesis concludes that security policy formation under the Funes 
administration was haphazardly conducted as an expedient to El Salvador’s security 
dilemma and resulted in at least a partial democratic breakdown in the processes 
envisioned by the 1992 peace accords. 
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El Salvador’s guerrilla organizations, combined under the banner of the Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front, or FMLN) and the Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador (Armed Forces of El 
Salvador, or FAES) stalemated after a grueling decade-long civil war from 1979–1992. 
At the close of the conflict, the international community and Salvadorans established 
almost laboratory-like conditions when developing the 1992 peace accords. For both 
exogenous and domestic reasons, the military’s control of society, dominant since the 
onset of the Great Depression, had fractured. Amid the ashes between the Salvadoran 
military—no longer lavishly supported by U.S. funding—and the FMLN guerrillas, a 
new political alliance took hold.1 Salvadoran business interests, civil society, former 
guerrillas, and military remnants alike worked with the United Nations (UN) to foster a 
new relationship that featured a drastic reduction of military forces. The impunity and 
ruthlessness of the armed forces violated a level of trust that even the Salvadoran people, 
used to the legacy of military rule, were not willing to abide.2 The Chapultepec Peace 
Accords signed in January 1992, facilitated under the UN mission to El Salvador 
(ONUSAL), was the first UN complex peace-building effort and the most successful 
model for newly emerging democracies recovering from civil wars and military 
authoritarianism.3 Several UN interventions kept the peace in the years that immediately 
followed the accords, and El Salvador did not relapse into conflict. Not surprisingly, in 
order to purchase that peace, compromise was required.  
The Salvadoran Army has maintained much of its autonomy from the government 
and civil society to this day. Uniformed officers at the Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 
                                                 
1 William Deane Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War 
in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 233–4. 
2 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 155. 
3 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace 
Operations (Princeton: University Press, 2006), 206. 
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(Salvadoran Ministry of Defense, or MDN) control plans, operations, and budgets, while 
civilians in the executive and legislative branches are either incapable of or unwilling to 
assert their authority.4 While former FMLN guerrillas could join the newly formed 
Policía Nacional Civil (National Civilian Police, or PNC), these same guerrillas were not 
allowed to join the Salvadoran armed forces. Amnesty for war crimes, one of the 
compromises ceded by the Salvadoran government to keep the peace, has left thousands 
of human rights violations unanswered.5 The UN Truth Commission in 1993 connected 
war crimes to more than a hundred Salvadoran military officers, but these officers were 
dismissed, not prosecuted.6 Justice has come slowly and indirectly for some; in 2011, the 
Salvadoran government under President Mauricio Funes affirmed that all military officers 
with international arrest warrants would be detained and investigated—a significant step 
against the power of the amnesty law.7 Despite Funes’ claim, however, ex-ministers of 
defense José Guillermo García Merino and Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, the two 
most highly ranking targets for human rights abuses during the war, remain in retirement 
in Florida. Both ex-generals immigrated to the United States in 1989 under the George H. 
W. Bush Administration.8 It is still unclear that extradition back to El Salvador would 
produce a conviction over the current amnesty. 
Despite these shortcomings, the rising cost of domestic insecurity and economic 
stagnation in the region has led Salvadoran civilian leadership to rely more heavily on the 
military, granting the FAES a larger role in intelligence gathering and internal security 
                                                 
4 “Report on the Security Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean,” ed. Lucía Dammert, 1st ed. 
(Santiago, Chile: FLACSO-Chile, 2007), 24–8, 49. 
5 Shawn L. Bird and Philip J. Williams, “El Salvador: Revolt and Negotiated Transition,” in 
Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America, ed. Thomas W. Walker and Ariel 
C. Armony (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 39. 
6 J. Mark Ruhl, “Curbing Central America’s Militaries,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 3 (2004): 142–
3. 
7 Geoff Thale, “El Salvador Government Holds Military Officers in Custody in Jesuit Case,” 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 10 August 2011, 
http://www.wola.org/commentary/salvadorgovernment_holds_military_officers_in_custody_in_jesuit_case
. 
8 James Estrin, “Deporting Human Rights Abusers,” New York Times, 15 November 2014, 
www.Lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/deporting-human-rights-abusers/. 
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than envisioned in the peace accords.9 Even with the 2009 transfer of power from the 
rightist Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance, or ARENA) 
Party to the leftist FMLN party, the FAES’s relative autonomy has not diminished; I 
argue it has increased. Two causal mechanisms are discussed in this paper: 1) civil-
military relations and 2) militarization. Civil-military relations in the context of this thesis 
mean the relationship that El Salvador’s civilian leadership, most notable the president, 
has with the FAES. The state of civil-military relations under President Mauricio Funes’ 
administration is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III. Militarization is intended here 
to describe the level at which the FAES affects average Salvadorans. Militarization most 
obviously manifests itself in the elevated numbers of FAES troops on the streets. 
Militarization is discussed further in Chapter IV. 
This study evaluates both the current state of civil-military relations and 
militarization in El Salvador in order to answer two questions: How has the state of civil-
military relations in El Salvador affected the recent trend in militarization—or in El 
Salvador’s case, re-militarization—during President Mauricio Funes’ administration 
(2009–2014), and what have been the implications of this trend? Considering the high 
cost of the Salvadoran civil war and the comprehensiveness of the 1992 peace accords,10 
it is remarkable to witness the reemergence of the military in contemporary El Salvador. 
The crime wave that swept the region from the late 1990s continues to this day has forced 
politicians on the left and the right to place more responsibility of internal security on 
military forces11 in violation of the constitution and the peace accords—a trend that 
Funes embraced throughout his term in office. 
The Salvadoran Constitution and Peace Accords call for the domestic use of the 
FAES for emergencies only. For example, Article 168 of the Salvadoran Constitution 
outlines the president’s responsibilities: “Exceptionally, if the regular means for 
maintaining internal peace, tranquility, and public order have been exhausted, the 
                                                 
9 Thale, “El Salvador Government.” 
10 Bird and Williams, “El Salvador: Revolt and Negotiated Transition,” 40. 
11 “La Situación de la Seguridad y la Justicia 2009–2014: Entre Expectativas de Cambio, Mano Dura 
Militar y Treguas Pandilleras,” ed. Jeannette Aguilar, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (San 
Salvador: IUDOP, 2014), 90. 
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President of the Republic may deploy the Armed Force for this end. The activation of the 
Armed Force shall be limited to the time and the measure strictly necessary for re-
establishing order and shall cease as soon as this task is completed.”12 The Chapultepec 
Peace Accords of 1992 state that “the maintenance of internal peace, tranquility, order 
and public security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces as an institution 
responsible for national defense. The armed forces play a role in this sphere only in very 
exceptional circumstances, where the normal means have been exhausted.”13 The use of 
the FAES as an emergency force has been used indefinitely since Funes took office, 
hardly in keeping with the letter of the law.  
In 1993, only a year after the peace accords were signed, conservative ARENA 
President Alfredo Cristiani called on the FAES to patrol highways and coffee harvests.14 
A decade later, strong anti-gang policies, mano dura in 2003 and super mano dura in 
2004, pushed through by ARENA President Antonio Saca, gave the PNC new powers of 
enhanced search and seizure, suspected gang member detention, and profiling. The PNC 
slowly acquired some of the capabilities of the old state security services that were 
abolished by the accords. In 2009, President Mauricio Funes, an FMLN candidate and 
proponent of seeking alternatives to mano dura, declared by emergency decree that the 
military accompany PNC foot patrols in San Salvador to control the crime problem.15 
The decree was renewed and extended throughout his presidency and continues today 
under the presidency of Salvador Sánchez Cerén. While deploying the FAES to improve 
citizen security is justifiable, their extended use in this capacity has weakened the legal 
institutional framework of El Salvador. No other long-term solution has been successful, 
and so the FAES remains on the streets. 
                                                 
12 Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador: 1983, as amended in 2003, Article 168, 12th paragraph, 
Constitution Finder, University of Richmond, accessed 11 October 2014, 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/ElSalvador1983English.pdf.  
13 Chapultepec Peace Accords: 1992, 16 January 1992, United Nations Peacemaker, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SV_920116_ChapultepecAgreement.pdf. 
14 Charles T. Call, “Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El 
Salvador.” Journal of Latin American Studies 35, (November 2003): 836. 
15 Clare Ribando Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. R43616), 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43616.pdf, 8. 
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I argue that it is precisely when soldiers join the police in patrolling the streets 
that the civil-military issue is most important. In other words, improper policy formation 
while the state’s instruments of violence, the FAES, are in daily contact with everyday 
Salvadorans, produces a disproportionate effect upon society as opposed to if these forces 
were not present at all. Thus, civil-military relations in El Salvador, specifically the 
relationships at the top, shape the extent of militarization in the country. The research 
questions of what that relationship is and how it affects militarization matter because 
Salvadoran state policy may be driven by these factors. As Bruneau puts it, “At the most 
basic level, civil-military relations are about power, and deal with who is in fact in 
control in any state at any particular time.”16 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
1. Counter-Arguments 
This thesis assesses the civil-military relationship and the level of militarization in 
El Salvador, and explores the causal linkage between the two. Beyond this, I draw some 
insights into Salvadoran policy formation along these lines. I uncover many of the 
dynamics that make El Salvador both a unique case, but one also that conforms to present 
theories of military and society. Notwithstanding, the following hypotheses go against the 
assertion that the civil-military relationship has affected the level of militarization in El 
Salvador. 
First among potential other explanations is the assertion that Salvadoran society is 
not militarized, or at least not to the extent that should cause alarm. Many countries 
around the world—including the United States—have police forces and armed 
government agents operating amongst the civilian populace, to include intelligence 
gatherers and internal security operators.  
Another argument assesses that the civilian leadership in El Salvador is firmly in 
charge of the leadership of the armed forces, indicating on some level a healthy measure 
                                                 
16 Thomas C. Bruneau, “The Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lessons from Central America and 
Prospects for Colombia,” in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, ed. Albrecht 
Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), 226. 
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of civilian control. If El Salvador is indeed militarized, this suggests that the Salvadoran 
military, rather than choosing to increase its internal security role, has been thrust into the 
position by its political masters. Pion-Berlin asserts in the case of El Salvador that 
“armies cannot easily convert domestic roles into positions of political authority—even in 
the midst of crisis—when democratic institutions are strong and elected officials enjoy 
some semblance of civilian control.”17 If El Salvador is not militarized, then this 
assertion alludes to the best case: complete civilian control at all levels. This assumes that 
the president exercises as much control over the leadership of the FAES as a PNC patrol 
commander over his mixed contingent of PNC officers and Salvadoran Army soldiers at 
the micro level. 
The final countervailing hypothesis considered here is that there is no causal 
linkage between the health of the Salvadoran civil-military relationship and the degree of 
militarization in Salvadoran society. This claim suggests that the two phenomena occur 
independently. In other words, the degree of militarization is not the result of policy, but 
rather something at the micro-level, perhaps something cultural. 
2. Chapter Outline 
This thesis assesses the current state of civil-military relations and militarization 
in El Salvador. This chapter explores the literature on civil-military relations as it pertains 
to the Salvadoran case. The literature review also defines militarization and explains the 
metrics by which militarization in El Salvador is to be assessed. 
Chapter II presents the history of civil-military relations and militarization in El 
Salvador up to 2009. Salvadoran history, not unlike other histories, is a clash of 
perspectives of the peasantry, military, guerrillas, and the elite. The objective of Chapter 
II is to demonstrate the prevalence and importance of the military in El Salvador’s history 
and lay a logical path to the Funes Administration (2009–2014) to the present day. 
Chapter III assesses civil military relations in El Salvador using the trinity of civil 
military relations as derived by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR). The 
                                                 
17 Pion-Berlin, “Latin American Civil-Military Relations,” 68–9. 
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assessment does not consider any relative gains that have been made since the peace 
accords in 1992—considerable to be sure—but only considers the condition of the civil-
military relationship from 2009–2014. 
Chapter IV assesses militarization in El Salvador. Relying heavily on the 
historical survey of military involvement in society presented in Chapter II, Chapter IV 
explores both the quantitative and qualitative measures of militarization in El Salvador. 
Chapter V draws upon the assessments of civil-military relations and 
militarization to explore national policy implications. The chapter concludes with two 
specific case analyses under the Funes Administration: the gang truce of 2012 and the 
case of President Funes’ military confidant, General David Munguía Payés. 
C. DISCUSSION 
The literature on civil-military relations is extensive; that of Latin America is 
significant. Militarization, however, is a term that is used interchangeably and has an 
amorphous definition. Unfortunately, there is no science or precise form of measurement 
for this study. The literature on these topics is a battlefield of semantics and possesses a 
myriad of frameworks. 
Civil-military relations, in the context of this paper, refer to the relationship that 
the armed forces has with civilian political leadership in El Salvador. In order to 
determine how the military interacts with government, one must first understand how the 
military fits within the superstructure of the state. The most basic conception of the 
military is a bureaucratic entity that serves the state. Weber envisioned professional 
bureaucracies as estates that serve politics, complement one another, and form the basis 
for the modern state.18 Weber also describes how the state utilizes the military: as the 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”19 Weber’s 
nineteenth century understanding of bureaucracy is the very tool through which civilians 
                                                 
18 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Garth and C. Wright Mills 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 83–4. 
19 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 78. 
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exercise control over the military—the implementer of violence. In the ideal type, Weber 
argues these agencies should be “fully developed bureaucratic mechanisms.”20 Mares and 
Martínez argue that the “democratic consolidation of the armed forces is their conversion 
into a military administration at the service of a democratically elected government.”21 
From this conception, the military serves the interests of the state, but does not 
necessarily control those same interests. 
With this understanding of how the armed forces should ideally fit into the state, 
the next logical step is an understanding about how the government interacts with the 
military. Who is in charge? Command authority aside, administering the operations and 
plans of the military is equally important. Yet these administrative functions are at the 
very center of democratic civilian control. Martínez summarizes democratic civilian 
control as “normalizing the existence and activities of the military administration among 
the public, together with the need for a comprehensive and coordinated national security 
strategy, in which the armed forces will, with all certainty, be one of the most important 
policy instruments.”22 As a democracy, El Salvador must meet the requirement of true 
democratic civilian control. Bruneau breaks democratic civilian control of the military 
into four mutually supporting categories: 1) a civilianized defense ministry (MOD), 2) 
legislative involvement, 3) interagency cooperation, and 4) an intelligence unit that 
supports both the MOD and the legislature.23 
Pion-Berlin summarizes the qualities of an “empowered” MOD—a sort of ideal 
type for all countries to strive for—one that “organizes and equips the defense forces, and 
prepares defense objectives, plans, strategies and even doctrines”; is constituted by a 
                                                 
20 Weber paraphrased in Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze Jr., “Ministries of Defense and 
Democratic Control,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, 1st 
ed., ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 72. 
21 Rafael Martínez and David R. Mares, “Introduction,” in Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin 
America, ed. David R. Mares and Rafael Martínez (Chicago: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 23. 
22 Rafael Martínez, “Objectives for Democratic Consolidation in the Armed Forces,” in Debating 
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, ed. David R. Mares and Rafael Martínez (Chicago: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2014), 37. 
23 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civil-military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox 
Revisited,” Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 19, no. 1 (2005), 126. 
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civilian minister and mostly civilian staff; creates organizational distance between 
military top brass and civilian power brokers; and divides the power of the armed forces 
through competition of the different services (army, navy, air force).24 While Pion-
Berlin’s empowered MOD falls on the highly developed side of the democratic civilian 
control spectrum, Matei conceptualizes the evolution of such an entity: “Institutional 
control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the security forces, 
exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other regulations that 
empower the civilian leadership, to civilian-led organizations with professional staffs.”25 
Aside from the MOD, legislative assemblies should approve and oversee all 
military activities. Agüero cites the following legislative capacities: “1) conduct general 
policy without interference from the military, 2) define goals and general organization of 
national defense, 3) formulate and conduct defense policy, and 4) monitor the 
implementation of military policy.”26 
Interagency cooperation is much more than popular jargon; the free sharing of 
resources between the civilian and military sectors breaks down the walls of complete 
military autonomy. Diamint suggests that so-called third generation measures in civil-
military relations necessitate, among other things, “close links between military and 
civilian agencies” because as “the division between military and civilian roles [fades] 
away,” some combination of militarized police or policing military may play a role in the 
domestic scene.27 
Lastly, having the intelligence capabilities in an agency that supports both the 
MOD and the legislature is what ultimately enables civilian oversight capabilities. 
                                                 
24 David Pion-Berlin, “Latin American Civil-Military Relations: What Progress Has Been Made?” in 
Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, ed. David R. Mares and Rafael Martínez (Chicago: 
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27 Rut Diamint, “Latin America and the Military Question Reexamined,” in Debating Civil-Military 
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Bruneau and Dombroski break down intelligence in very basic terms: “Since knowledge 
equals power, it is important to specify who may see the intelligence and in what form.”28 
The authors further elaborate that the continued operation of the intelligence service 
outside the purview of democratic civilian control in pursuit of “perceived internal 
threats… tends to emphasize national security matters over social welfare policies, thus 
creating the preconditions for the emergence of a more autonomous and less accountable 
security intelligence apparatus.”29 
Democratic civilian control alone does not lend a complete picture of civil-
military relations. How does one assess whether the FAES have satisfied the missions 
and roles assigned to them? Specifically in the case of El Salvador, well-beyond the 
consolidating democracy phase, the FAES’s performance should be measured in terms of 
effectiveness. The argument is no longer whether the military will usurp control—
preoccupations of civil-military scholars of the authoritarian years of the 1970s–80s— 
as many of the conditions for military rule have vanished.30 In other words, for El 
Salvador under the recent FMLN leadership, control and administration is just half of the 
puzzle. As Bruneau suggests, what is needed is a model that “balances democratic 
oversight and control of military affairs, efficiency in defense spending, and the 
effectiveness of military forces.”31 Bruneau conceives this model as the trinity of civil-
military relations. 
Bruneau’s trinity is the central tool for analysis of civil-military relations in this 
paper. The trinity involves effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic civilian control 
(already described). This model is ideal for El Salvador because it establishes who is in 
                                                 
28 Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of 
Control in New Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military 
Relations, 1st ed., ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
2006), 162. 
29 Bruneau and Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence,” 155. 
30 Carlos Waisman, “Series Editor’s Preface,” in Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, 
ed. David R. Mares and Rafael Martínez (Chicago: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), XI. 
31 Thomas C. Bruneau and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Global Trends and Their Impact on Civil-Military 
Relations,” in Global Politics of Defense Reform, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Harold A. Trinkunas, 1st ed. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 4. 
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control of the military and whether the military performs the functions assigned to it and 
within a budget. Like most Central American countries, El Salvador has had a long 
history of independent military violence and government oppression. Knowing that 
elected officials are in charge of the armed forces, and that those same officials create and 
evaluate missions and budgets for said military is of the utmost importance. 
Effectiveness is the ability of the armed forces to implement the roles and 
missions assigned to it by civilians in charge.32 Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas argue that 
effectiveness is ultimately achieved once civilian leadership recovers from their 
“attention deficits” in areas of national defense.33 Pion-Berlin envisions the ideal of 
effectiveness being military commanders  who listen to their civilian leaders and “use 
their authority to set the innovations in motion down through the chain of command; who 
can promote young officers more open minded to change; and who can remove the old 
guard who stand in the way.”34 
The third and final pillar of the trinity, efficiency, is the ability of the military to 
conduct its roles and missions in a cost effective manner.35 Giraldo stresses that 
“civilians have abdicated their responsibility to provide for national security when setting 
spending levels and have permitted excessive military autonomy.”36 This paper assesses 
the manner in which civilians oversee military outlays. 
Effectiveness and efficiency, taken together with democratic civilian control are 
then used and applied to the armed forces’ roles and missions—terms that will be 
clarified here. As Bruneau notes, “civilian leaders are rediscovering the importance of the 
armed forces. The issue is, however, whether civilians are able to determine the roles and 
                                                 
32 Bruneau, “Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited,” 123. See also Bruneau and Trinkunas, “Global 
Trends,” 10. 
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34 David Pion-Berlin, “The Challenge to Reform Defense,” in Global Politics of Defense Reform, ed. 
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missions of the armed forces.”37 Shemella provides a good understanding of roles and 
missions, terms used very loosely when describing the armed forces. He cites the 
Pentagon’s definition: a role is “‘a broad and enduring purpose’ provided by the 
Congress to each branch of the armed services” while missions are “specific tasks that 
clearly indicate an action to be taken.”38  This concept is directly applicable to the current 
state of military affairs in Central America as politicians focus on altering the military’s 
role, something that has enduring consequences, when they should merely be assigning 
or managing specific military missions. Diamint throws role and mission confusion into 
relief by asserting that “the armed forces in several Latin American countries do not have 
specific functions.”39 This sort of undefined status leaves both civilian and military 
leadership looking for relevance for the armed forces. Mares and Martínez warn that the 
military role should provide “the state with one part, outside its borders, of its monopoly 
of violence…Otherwise, an opportunism or misguided pragmatism could lead us to settle 
for what we have and resign ourselves to levels of autonomy, and even power, for the 
armed forces that are unacceptable in a democracy.”40 
The second main goal of this thesis is to identify the level of militarization in El 
Salvador. The front page of La Prensa Gráfica usually features a crime scene with 
masked PNC officers holding semiautomatic rifles. One might conclude that El Salvador 
is militarized based on what they read and watch in the news. Indeed, this analysis 
touches on what can be drawn from media photography and archival evidence. Yet, an 
analysis of militarization must draw on more than just pictures; in order to address this 
issue, a workable definition must be derived. Sotomayor defines militarization as the 
“adoption and use of military models, methods, concepts, doctrines, procedures, and 
                                                 
37 Bruneau, “Military in Post-Conflict Societies,” 228. 
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personnel in police activities, thus giving a military character to public safety (and public 
space) questions.”41 
Lowy and Sader define militarization in terms of colonization: 
The militarization of the state is not simply the transition from the purely 
military to the political, but the overwhelming of the state apparatus as a 
whole by the armed forces-in essence the “colonization” of the majority of 
state and state-related structures (at the apex of the pyramid) by the 
military and the partial or total fusion of the repressive apparatuses with 
other apparatuses of the system of political domination.42 
This definition of militarization is complete insofar as describing the way in which a state 
is infiltrated by the military, but does not address the cultural aspect of militarization: 
how does the military’s presence affect the citizenry? Williams and Walter, who concur 
with Lowy and Sader’s definition, add that 
militarization is not only limited to the state level; it also can occur at the 
micro level of everyday life… The military’s exercise of social control at 
the micro level can provide it with a “loyal” political clientele that ensures 
its continued control of the state. Militarization generally occurs at the 
micro level when the state is incapable of achieving hegemony in the 
Gramscian sense— i.e., it is unable to generate societal consensus. In such 
instances, the armed forces use coercion to guarantee the state’s political 
domination43 
Chapter II expounds on the history of militarization in El Salvador up to 2009. In 
the case of El Salvador, militarization has taken a special hold in heavily agricultural 
areas where suppression by military police is commonplace.44 El Salvador, a country 
with a long history of agro-export in coffee, is no stranger to this model. Vickers 
summarizes the proliferation of militarization in Salvadoran society in the decades 
leading up to the peace accords: 
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Three branches of the armed forces carried out internal security functions: 
the National Police and the Treasury Police, which operated primarily in 
urban areas, and the National Guard, which operated in rural areas... A 
separate National Intelligence Directorate gathered intelligence 
information and targeted suspected guerrilla sympathizers. Police officers 
were trained in the military academy with a doctrinal emphasis on 
anticommunism and counterinsurgency. Officers moved freely between 
security forces and regular army assignments.45 
In order to measure militarization during the Funes Administration, this thesis 
evaluates both quantitative and qualitative metrics of FAES soldiers on the street, while 
relying heavily on the historical survey of El Salvador. Perhaps the leading scholar in 
terms of quantitative measures of militarization is Bowman. Bowman asserts that “high 
levels of militarization result in low levels of formal democracy in Latin America.”46 He 
contends that Latin America has always been prone to “praetorian” leadership from the 
military that, for lack of an external mission, focuses solely on keeping its own citizens in 
line through coercive means.47 To measure militarization, Bowman uses military 
spending as a percent of GDP and what he describes as the participation ratio or the 
number of soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants.48 Measuring the military budget as a percent of 
GDP demonstrates the government’s relative commitment to the armed forces, and thus 
its peoples’ commitment. 
This study also considers photographic evidence of militarization in El Salvador. 
While photographs can be just as biased as writing, they nevertheless are part of the 
overall narrative. In Chapter IV, I have laid out several photographs from El Salvador’s 
relatively politically neutral daily which aspects of the daily effect of militarization can 
be seen. 
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Chapter IV also lays out the security environment from 2009–2014. As already 
mentioned, this study of militarization relies heavily on the historical survey and present 
context. For instance, in order to understand the nature of the FAES patrols in San 
Salvador, it is necessary to understand the conditions that have led to their involvement. 
This section reviews the magnitude of the threat and the response, in terms of finances 
and manpower. 
Bowman’s metric provides a start. The number or duration of Salvadoran Army 
patrols also offers some basis for analysis. A comparative study of other Central 
American countries or other twenty-year-old democracies might derive the relative 
location of El Salvador on a scale of militarization, but this provides little value when 
considering the connection between Salvadoran civil-military relations and militarization. 
Different civil-military relationships exist in other countries, so a precise connection 
cannot be established. As such, this study considers militarization as the present volume 
of military involvement in Salvadoran state security relative to its past. 
From this perspective, I will approach the analysis of the state of militarization in 
El Salvador. Again, statistics alone are telling of a highly militarized society, but the 
particulars of the Salvadoran case are washed out in them. In order to better understand 
the extent of militarization in El Salvador, a cultural element to the study of militarization 
is required. Only by understanding how individual Salvadorans have adapted to 
generations of militarization will one grasp its implications. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY 
This history of Salvadoran civil-military relations and militarization has evolved 
from one primarily steeped in alliances between the military and landholding elites to one 
centered around using the FAES as a political promise to improve citizen security in the 
more dangerous zones of El Salvador. The agro-export model, conceived during the 
Spanish colonial era, ripened over the centuries under European and U.S. influence. The 
landholding elites in Central America created Western-style nations, and in so doing, 
founded armies to ensure state sovereignty and integrity. Ostensibly, to serve the state 
impartially, the new professional organ of the armed forces sought patrons and relevance 
during the years of military rule (1932–1979).49 While land distribution and social 
reconstruction occurred in Costa Rica, El Salvador (in addition to Honduras and 
Guatemala) remained relatively untouched. During the Salvadoran Civil War (1979–
1992), the landed elite-military alliance shifted largely in part due to external and internal 
pressures; the end of the Cold War removed the necessity for the United States to prop up 
an anti-communist regime while internal pressure from business elites to improve El 
Salvador’s economic environment forced the Salvadoran state to reassess its relationship 
with the military. Immediately after the signing of the 1992 peace accords, as the military 
diminished by half—some 63,170 FAES personnel in 1992 to some 30,500 in 1994—the 
FAES sought new political bedfellows and relevance.50 With the rise of a variety of 
domestic insecurity challenges shortly following the peace accords, the military regained 
some prominence as a state actor while still maintaining a certain modicum of autonomy. 
The following historical narrative covers the evolution of the Salvadoran military and is 
broken up into three general survey periods: military rule (1932–1979), the civil war 
(1979–1992), and democratization and mano dura (1992-2009). The period of FMLN 
leadership (2009-2014), the main period of analysis for this thesis, is covered in more 
depth in Chapters III through V. 
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A. MILITARY RULE: 1932–1979 
The landed elite planted coffee on their plantations in the 20th century when the 
indigo of the previous centuries no longer sold at market. While the crops changed, the 
ruling elite did not. As Perez-Brignoli states, the elite entered “into a ‘zero-sum’ power 
struggle… in which the gains of a few imply total loss or the many.”51 As a necessary 
adjunct to the maintenance of a plantation-export economy, those in power relied on 
largely coercive measures to maintain the status quo or whenever their privileges were 
questioned.52 Perhaps the most notorious such violent juncture occurred in 1932, the year 
that peasant and communist Augustín Farabundo Martí fomented insurrection. Martí 
provided the elite an opportunity to test the new implement of the state: the FAES. The 
Salvadoran Army responded in what is now known as la Matanza; soldiers massacred 
approximately 17,000 Salvadorans in the span of three weeks. As a result of la Matanza, 
Wood argues that “the fervently anticommunist elites identified any progressive social 
policy as a threat [and] worked with hardline elements of the military to defeat reformist 
efforts.”53 
During the Great Depression, the military served a larger purpose than henchmen 
for the elites. After the failure of revolution and reform in 1932, General Maximiliano 
Hernández Martínez governed El Salvador from 1932–1944. Stanley asserts that 
Martínez perfected the “protection racket state,” whereby he “was in a position to 
manipulate elite perceptions [and]… defend [elites] from a threat that he either provoked 
or made to seem greater than it was.”54 The protection racket gave the military much 
more than autonomy: the ability to manipulate their makers. Under the Salvadoran 
Army’s 60-year tenure, Finer’s simple conundrum rings true: “The wonder… is not why 
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[the military] rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them.”55 If the 
military were any other organization, it would have merely striven to survive and expand 
within the state apparatus; uniquely poised with the state sanctioned arsenal of violence 
and national esteem, the military sought more. 
Tilly argues that wars make states and states make wars: “War making, extraction, 
and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making.”56 Following Tilly’s 
line of logic, the Salvadoran military grew commensurate with the state. Yet, as Centeno 
argues, the European pattern of state-building did not work in Latin America. He argues 
that Latin America embodies “limited states” that engage in “limited war,” the fruit of 
which are the acceptance of colonialism and hegemonic control externally and divided 
elites, race and class divisions, and post-colonial chaos internally.57 Therefore,, what is 
left is the deadly implement of state power in the midst of an incomplete state. In the 
context of El Salvador, Stanley argues that General Martínez and his followers “used 
analogous protection against internal enemies to increase their call on the resources of 
capital and strengthen the claim of militaries, rather than civilians, to control over the 
state.”58 The Salvadoran military operated with impunity and coercion leading up 
through the years of the civil war, tamping down on several possible openings for reform. 
Martínez’s bid for power—well-received at the onset of the Great Depression and 
falling commodities prices—the military established control of El Salvador to ensure 
stability. The Salvadoran state permeated the countryside in the form of mandatory 
military conscription. El Salvador adopted the modern European military model of near 
universal military conscription; like the layers of an onion, tranches of the male 
population served in the various active, reserve, and guard components.59 Walter and 
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Williams describe the extensive nature of the rural military network as follows: 
The Salvadoran countryside, especially coffee-growing areas, had come 
largely under military control or surveillance by 1930. The Guardia 
Nacional together with the comandantes locales and their escoltas 
militares, plus a considerable number of troops in reserve, constituted a 
parallel power structure that could easily challenge other local and 
national authorities, such as the alcaldes, the urban police, the state’s 
ministries, and even the president of the republic himself.60 
Many Salvadorans served in the army, which in addition to professional military 
training and combat duty meant participation in internal state infrastructural projects. 
National guard units and other military organizations, more loosely affiliated with the 
state, extended even further into the peasantry: patrullas cantonales, escoltas militares, 
and Guardia Cívica were all organizations that added to the number of military and 
reserve units, sometimes overlapping, and provided extensive means by which the state 
had access to nearly every man, woman, and child in El Salvador.61 These militarized 
units, by and large, owed their loyalty to local commanders, who in turn owed their 
loyalty to local landowners. The result of the military stratification of Salvadoran society 
is a chain of command from the lowliest coffee picker to the chief general of the 
Salvadoran Army. 
In the analysis of the military and the landed-elite, one must acknowledge that 
these were not homogenous blocs. Actors within the military chose to support the elite; 
naturally, those who aligned with the landed class were more senior in rank and who 
benefited most highly from the relationship. The military was challenged on several 
occasions by junior officers—closer to the working class—within its ranks to pursue land 
and social reform. The most notable example of such a struggle was the overthrow of 
General Carlos Humberto Romero in 1979. Romero, fraudulently installed in 1977, 
persisted in the military’s unsuccessful and widely unpopular policy of subordinating 
agrarian interests to that of a new industrial class.62 While Romero and others in the right 
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wing conservative faction of the military intrigued with civilian elites, others in the 
FAES, military intelligentsia, and military run police units (the National Guard, the 
Treasury Police, and the National Police), simply sold their mercenary services.63 The 
result of an inwardly conflicted military apparatus was a bloodbath of violence and 
repression against any and all challengers. In the end, the junior officers allied with other 
reform-minded civilians and senior officers in a coup against Romero. 
One notable feature of the military that played a fundamental role in El Salvador’s 
history is the presence of generational classes known as tandas. These officers rise up 
through the ranks together and typically share similar views and experiences. In militaries 
that are firmly under civilian control, the intrigues of these officers are insignificant in 
terms of national policy. However, in the case of El Salvador after the Romero coup, one 
particular tanda known as the Equipo Molina, which graduated from 1956–1958 and 
formed the high command in 1979, played a very influential role in history. 
Unfortunately the governing military juntas that resulted from the reform-oriented 1979 
coup were already infiltrated with right-wing conservative military officers of the Equipo 
Molina—Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez, Colonel José Guillermo García, and Colonel 
Nicolás Carranza—who undermined its agenda and ultimately steered El Salvador to 
civil war.64 
Up to this point, the discussion has considered the structural alliance of the 
military and the coffee-growing elite. There existed other actors, as well. Indeed, a 
growing movement sought to have their voice heard in an environment bereft of political 
space.65 The successful guerrilla action in Cuba simultaneously generated hope for 
guerrilla movements throughout Latin America while at the same time frightening the 
conservative right into further repression. After the Cuban Revolution and the 
importation of the Cold War into the Western Hemisphere, militarized peasantry served 
as a bulwark against communism and land reform. Landowning elites and military 
leaders alike played up the threat of the specter of communist subversion in order to 
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ensure international support for conservative regimes under military control. Stanley 
remarks that “US doctrines for how allied states should go about defending themselves 
against potential internal enemies dovetailed perfectly with the institutions and ideology 
of class oppression that were already in place.”66 International funding and proxy 
conflict, new to the region in the latter half of the 20th century, meant a wellspring of 
funding and support for the Salvadoran military. Weapons technologies from radios to 
rifles proliferated in El Salvador during the crusade against the militant left. While 
mature democracies utilized these technologies to enhance legitimate policing practices, 
many Latin American states, El Salvador among them, used them to improve their 
coercive powers.67 
Security intelligence agencies began to track the movements of subversives and 
eliminate potential problems. During the 1960s and 1970s, the rural National Guard, the 
urban National Police, and the Treasury Police were El Salvador’s three main security 
agencies. Stanley points out that these agencies “tended to maintain close mercenary 
relationships with landowners and business elites and shared with them an intense, self-
serving anticommunism.”68 The intelligence apparatus possessed informants in all the 
local departments. The development of a coercive intelligence network sparked resistance 
to the state in the form of guerrilla activity. 
Salvadoran guerrilla movements were fragmented and worked at cross purposes 
before the civil war. They were the Partido Comunista de El Salvador (Communist Party 
of El Salvador, or PCS), the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí 
(Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces, or FLP), the Ejército Revolucionario del 
Pueblo (People’s Revolutionary Army, or ERP), and the Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores Centroamericanos (Revolutionary Workers’ Party of Central America, or 
PRTC). The government’s brutal actions at the outset of the civil war galvanized these 
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disparate groups into one: the FMLN.69 Invoking the legend of the revolutionary peasant 
leader Agustín Farabundo Martí Rodríguez, martyred by the military government of 
President Hernández Martínez in 1932, the FMLN armed itself and fought back. Not 
unlike guerrilla movements throughout Latin America, the countryside became a game of 
checkers while the military apparatus and the guerrillas competed for the hearts and 
minds of Salvadorans, sometimes through civic action, often through coercion.70 
While the leadership of the FMLN was mostly composed of college students, 
much of the rank and file came from the peasantry of the coffee fields. Most joined 
because of their experiences with the government, and many were organized secretly by 
Catholic priests.71 Additionally, the guerrillas received training and weapons from Cuba 
and Vietnam among other Soviet bloc states.72 The excessively coercive state security 
complex drove a wedge between the traditional position of the Salvadoran conscript’s 
loyalty to the state and his desire to protect what belonged to him. The rift only grew 
wider the more the state tried to suppress the FMLN.73 The magnitude of the state’s 
repression at the outset of the civil war is revealed in the ability of the FMLN to actually 
function; the FMLN did not exhibit the same ideological homogeneity as other guerrilla 
groups in Latin America, being constituted by five previous guerrilla movements.74 The 
magnitude of the challenge forced them to work together. 
B. CIVIL WAR: 1979–1992 
Unfortunately, the Salvadoran Civil War occurred after the failure of a short-lived 
idealistic military coup of junior officers. These young officers succeeded in making 
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inroads with the political left who chafed under decades of military rule. In a quick, well-
coordinated, and bloodless action, the junior officers deposed President Carlos Humberto 
Romero. Idealism and reform seemed to be within the political left’s grasp. Yet when the 
momentum of the movement stalled, and divisions arose once again between the left and 
military conservatives, all hands abandoned the junta to failure. The resulting civilian 
government, forged through a series of pacts, allowed for the facade of a democratic 
opening to form under the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Cristian Democratic Party, or 
PDC). In this case, Williams and Walter’s assertion applies, that “even when the armed 
forces return to the barracks after a period of military rule, they still may be able to 
protect or even expand their entrenchment in post-authoritarian political structures.”75 
The PDC derived some legitimacy in light of the broad pact they struck with the 
military, as well as several broad concessions from the military; yet the military may 
have gained more. Their entry into the pact and their eventual return to the barracks 
placed them in favor of the United States, eager to support a democratic regime in the 
face of the mounting leftist guerrilla threat.76 Indeed, the United States applied a good 
deal of pressure on the Salvadoran military to curb their widely publicized death squad 
activities in an effort to make sure that counterinsurgency funding would not get tied up 
in the U.S. Congress.77 Williams and Walter allege that “despite the contributions that 
such pacts can make in furthering a transition from authoritarian rule… given the small 
number of participants involved, pacts are inherently undemocratic.”78 
In one grim testament to the ferocity to which militarization gave rise to murder, a 
right-wing vigilante group known as the White Warriors, purportedly upset over 
members of the Catholic clergy encouraging land reform, circulated a pamphlet in 1977 
with the slogan “Be a patriot! Kill a priest!”79 The government’s antagonism to those 
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Catholic priests allegedly practicing so-called liberation theology in the countryside 
spurned on the efforts of many priests to organize guerrilla resistance. The Catholic 
network in El Salvador was critical to resistance efforts.80 One event in particular in 
March 1980 caused a surge in guerrilla membership: the assassination of Archbishop 
Oscár Romero—in 2015 a candidate for sainthood—while he was saying mass.81 While 
not directly linked to the guerrillas, Romero was a highly influential and outspoken critic 
of the violence waged by the government against the poor. His martyrdom did not 
advance the government’s position. 
A few months after the Romero slaying, another violation against American 
citizens rocked U.S. support for the FAES. Four U.S. missionaries in El Salvador, three 
Catholic nuns and a fourth laywoman were raped and dumped in a shallow grave in 
December 1980.82 President Carter suspended military aid to the FAES, but only for a 
short period due to the backlash of conservatives who claimed Central America was 
falling into communist revolution.83 
After decades of intense repression, acute social and economic inequality, the 
blatant hijacking of any hopes of reform, and the failure of the 1979 Military Junta, the 
FMLN resorted to violence against the Salvadoran military in January 1981.84 In return, 
the military waged a dirty war against anyone and everyone who was suspected of 
supporting the guerrilla movement. This thrust elevated the FMLN to prominence and 
plunged El Salvador into civil war. The military, in an effort to maintain their 
predominance and institutional alliances, used unknown numbers of clandestine forces to 
intimidate the opposition through imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and murder. 
A year after the slaying of the American missionaries, although subdued in its 
international media exposure, the most prominent example of the FAES’s abuse of 
coercive power occurred: the massacre of El Mozote. An allegedly U.S. trained 
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Salvadoran Army battalion murdered the inhabitants of an entire village in northeastern 
El Salvador in December 1981. The incident demonstrated to both Salvadorans and the 
world the extent to which the military and the conservative elite would go to crush the 
FMLN. Under pressure to demonstrate some semblance of democracy, the right-wing 
elite spawned the ARENA party in 1981. ARENA quickly rose to dominate the 
legislature and in 1989, the first ARENA president took office, Alfredo Cristiani. In the 
early years of the civil war, ARENA was closely allied with the military. In 1983, a new 
Salvadoran constitution established that all responsibility of internal and external security 
belonged to the Salvadoran military.85 
The alliance between the FAES and El Salvador’s traditional elite started to 
dissipate, particularly as the political relevance of the latter waned. The Salvadoran Civil 
War did not occur in a vacuum. Indeed the external forces of globalization, neoliberal 
market reform, and the end of the Cold War largely upset existing socio-economic power 
structures. As Torres-Rivas states, “the landowners’ economic interests were refocused in 
light of new marketing opportunities and the determining factors of the new international 
capitalism.”86 This new rising class saw the ugliness and fruitlessness of the FAES’s 
efforts inside El Salvador, and almost more importantly, saw the detrimental pariah status 
attached to the country in light of catastrophes like El Mozote. By the end of the 1980s, 
the ARENA Party had realized that the FAES, particularly the intelligence security 
apparatus, was too costly an ally in terms of both ending the civil war and demonstrating 
progress for El Salvador.87 
It is impossible to discuss the civil war without commenting on the unnaturally 
long staying power of the FAES and the FMLN. The success of the Sandinista revolution 
in Nicaragua in 1979 confirmed U.S. Cold War policymakers’ worst fears that the specter 
of communism was closing in. With the domino theory thus confirmed, the U.S. 
government under President Ronald Reagan went to astronomical heights to provide the 
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Salvadoran government under the PDC and later the ARENA Party with the funding 
necessary to vanquish the opposition. Under the Reagan Doctrine, anything that 
resembled revolution in the Western Hemisphere was labeled pink and unauthorized. 
With the ghost of Cuba and the more recent loss of Nicaragua to the Sandinistas, the 
United States would not allow another domino to fall to the Soviets. The United States 
loaned El Salvador $3.2 billion in economic aid and $1.1 billion more in military aid 
during the course of the war.88 The United States dumped an average $1.3 billion 
annually into Central America in the 1980s.89 
In light of these figures, it is doubtful that the FAES could have waged such an 
enduring struggle without U.S. support. Further, the presence of such support initiated a 
proxy war, pouring Soviet weapons into El Salvador via Cuba and Nicaragua. Under the 
tutelage and support of U.S. advisors, the FAES waged counterinsurgency operations in 
El Salvador against the leftist FMLN guerrillas. Like hard-pressed guerrillas elsewhere, 
the FMLN embraced weapons and support where they could get them. Ultimately, the 
Salvadoran Civil War embodied the self-fulfilling prophecy of the Cold War in a 
microcosm, virtually militarizing the entire country. 
An enduring legacy of the Salvadoran Civil War was the mass exodus of 
Salvadorans, fleeing the country to find safety abroad, mostly in the United States. 
Additionally, the internal population shifted as still more peasants flocked to the outskirts 
of San Salvador in an effort to escape the violence in the countryside. Migration to urban 
environments began in earnest in the 1960s, most notably with the breakout of the Soccer 
War with Honduras in 1969. Much of the migration had to do with the influx of cheap 
manufactured goods as much as the untenable conditions for peasants in the 
countryside.90 In 1950, for example, 36.5 percent of the national population lived in 
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cities; by 2010, that figure jumped to 64.3 percent.91 The growth of urban poor is 
certainly not unique to El Salvador or even Central America, yet for the small, relatively 
resource poor and population rich country, the trend poses significant challenges. 
The tipping point of the war finally came in November 1989 when members of 
the Atlacatl Battalion of the Salvadoran Army, with orders to covertly silence Jesuit 
professor and activist Ignacio Ellacuría, assassinated the priest along with five other 
Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her sixteen year old daughter, Celina.92 Soon thereafter, 
the public outcry in the United States—in 1990 with some 650,000 Salvadoran 
immigrants93—prompted an extensive Congressional investigation and strong 
condemnation of El Salvador. It is nearly impossible to fathom the events that led to such 
a seemingly irrational action as that against Ellacuría and the others. Stanley explains that 
“from the hardliners’ point of view, negotiations would be unnecessary if the military 
were winning, and the military was so far not winning only because the gringos kept it 
from fighting as it should.”94 
The FMLN launched its largest offensive of the war in response to the high 
profile slayings and occupied several areas of San Salvador. This was part of the FMLN’s 
two-pronged approach of both political and military pressure to push for a negotiated 
settlement.95 The Salvadoran Army, unable to expel the guerrillas, ceded to a stalemate. 
Arnson summarizes the fallout that the Salvadoran military reaped: 
[The U.S. Congress] ultimately implicated the army chief of staff and 
other top officers in the decision to kill the priests. The work of the task 
force led Congress to adopt an unprecedented 50 percent cut in aid to the 
Salvadoran Army in 1990. If, during the Cold War, Congress was willing 
to overlook major human rights abuses for the sake of combatting 
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communist insurgents, no such imperative held U.S. policy together 
following the Cold War’s end. Aid cuts furthered the political isolation of 
the Salvadoran military. By signaling the breakdown of consensus over El 
Salvador policy, the aid cuts also pressured the Bush Administration to 
support a negotiated settlement.96 
 
While foreign interference may have prolonged the war, foreign influence certainly 
assisted in El Salvador’s recovery during and after the peace accords. 
C. DEMOCRATIZATION AND MANO DURA: 1992–2009 
1. ONUSAL and Demobilization 
Democratic and non-democratic governments took notice when UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Gali officially observed the signing of the peace accords in 
Chapultepec Castle in Mexico. The FAES had demonstrated such villainy during the war 
that the fundamental provisions of the accords had to do more with peaceably 
dismantling the military and the armed FMLN guerrillas than confronting the real social 
and economic problems in the country.97 The accords, among various other judicial, 
police, and political reforms, essentially halved the Salvadoran Army, abolished the three 
security forces under military control, created the PNC to be run outside the Ministry of 
Defense, disbanded the FMLN guerrillas and inaugurated the FMLN as a political party, 
and established an Ad Hoc Commission to investigate human rights violations during the 
war.98 Call summarizes this remarkable process: 
For the first time in history, a Latin American military submitted its 
officer corps to external review and vetting. Its worst human rights 
violators were purged, its budget reduced, and new levels of accountability 
and civilian input reached. As of 2002, the army was roughly the same 
size as the PNC, and its missions and doctrine reflected significant 
emphasis on classic external defense functions and respect for human 
rights and civilian control.99 
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The UN mediated the negotiations—the first time an international organization 
played such a role in the conclusion of an intrastate conflict.100 Additionally, the UN 
established a peacekeeping mission (ONUSAL) that provided several emergency 
mediators to El Salvador during their post-conflict reconstruction period. The UN also 
ensured that the international community properly funded all post-conflict initiatives in 
both El Salvador and Guatemala.101 
There are many scholars who argue that the peace accords did not go far enough 
by allowing the military continued autonomy in policy and training, access to 
government and police positions, and legal impunity for many officers for human rights 
violations during the war.102 For instance, Arana argues that “El Salvador’s cautious 
peace accords managed to avoid provoking most factions in the country’s army, but only 
by ignoring many of the important social and economic problems that led to the fighting 
in the first place.”103 Yet without mediation, it is also just as likely that the country could 
have relapsed into patterns of state repression and civil war. One thing is certain, 
however: El Salvador’s reformed and reinvented judicial and police institutions and 
fledgling political parties would not be prepared for the epic crime wave that was to 
besiege the country from the late 1990s to the present. This, in Call’s words, “helps 
explain why international observers consider El Salvador’s reforms a success story, but 
many Salvadorans do not.”104 
The gap between the expectations and the reality of the accords had largely to do 
with the negotiations and compromises themselves. The international community took 
action to attempt to change El Salvador for the better, yet pacts between FMLN and the 
military helped preserve the autonomy of the military while opening the state to the 
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former guerrillas. In keeping with their predilection to generate pacts in order to maintain 
autonomy, the military again engaged in negotiations with the FMLN. Arnson 
summarizes the ensuing debate: 
Throughout the course of the negotiations, the parties struggled with the 
issue of the reform of the armed forces. For the FMLN, the restructuring 
and purging, if not dissolution, of the armed forces was seen as paramount 
to resolve one of the underlying structural factors that had given rise to the 
war and, as a more practical matter, to permit the guerrillas to demobilize 
without simply being massacred. By the end of the talks, the government 
and guerrillas had agreed to reduce the size of the military and create an 
Ad Hoc Commission to purge it of corrupt and abusive members, dissolve 
the National Guard and the Treasury Police, create a new National 
Civilian Police open to the FMLN as well as to members of the existing 
National Police, dissolve all rapid-reaction army counterinsurgency 
battalions implicated in some of the worst human rights abuses of the war, 
and establish a truth commission whose mandate did not preclude the 
naming of names of those responsible for abuses.105 
In addition to the concessions above, the military also maintained some remnants 
of their intelligence apparatus under different names.106 The FMLN, in turn, gained 
access to the newly created PNC and was given political space in the form of the FMLN 
party. Wood argues that in the accords “the Left agreed to a democratic political regime 
and a capitalist economy with only limited socioeconomic reform, and the Right agreed 
to the Left’s participation in a democratic political regime along with some 
socioeconomic reform.”107 And so many involved in the atrocities of war—FAES and 
FMLN alike—were folded into the new internal security apparatus, while even more 
were disbanded, returned to society with the scars of the war and their firearms. 
Likely, the largest failing of the ONUSAL mission and the peace accords was the 
failure to properly demobilize and reintegrate civil war combatants in the post-war 
drawdown and the proper collection and disposal of firearms. Many promises were made 
to former guerrillas and Salvadoran soldiers of land grants and economic assistance 
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meant to reintegrate combatants into society. Yet these promises fell short, and many 
former combatants ended up indebted, untrained, and unassisted.108 After the war, large 
caches of military weapons remained in the civilian sector.109 The Salvadoran 
government estimates that 360,000 military weapons were not turned over during 
demobilization after the peace accords in 1992.110 Doyle and Sambanis sum up the effort 
thusly: “ONUSAL provided the right treatment for the right problem: monitoring and 
facilitation, along with technical assistance for institution-building.”111 
The global economic environment began to exert additional stresses on El 
Salvador with the opening and liberalization of markets in the 1990s, in addition to the 
collateral effects of NAFTA in Central America. Larger numbers of urban poor—unable 
to make livings on their own—crowded the slums around San Salvador and other cities. 
While neoliberal developments grew the Salvadoran economy in terms of low interest 
rates, low inflation, and more access to capital, the country was more than ever 
vulnerable to shocks, most notably the fallout from the global recession of 2008.112 
According to World Bank statistics, the Salvadoran poverty level has hovered around 40 
percent since the recession, 34.5 percent in 2012.113 In 2013, over 60 percent of the 
Salvadoran GDP was composed of services, whereas agriculture made up just over 10 
percent.114 
The latest chapter in Salvadoran military history highlights the question of how 
far has El Salvador really demobilized its fighting forces. After the reforms of the peace 
accords, funding for the FAES dropped incredibly (see Table 1). The weakened security 
state and the fledgling PNC were unable to grapple with the murderously high crime rates 
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of the late 1990s.115 As a result, some aspects of El Salvador’s security apparatus altered 
for the worst: a vigilante group of off-duty military and police known as El Clan de 
Planta (Black Shadow) took form to assassinate and intimidate perceived criminals. 
Another manifestation of the state’s impotence is the endemic corruption within the PNC. 
Àvalos claims that the PNC “has been plagued by its own ‘original sin’: the inclusion of 
former soldiers that worked with criminal groups and preserved a closed power structure 
that prevented any authority from investigating them.”116 Also during this period of 
democratization, El Salvador saw a sharp rise in the number of private security agents, 
otherwise hired guns: 6,000 in 1996 to 18,943 in 2001.117 By April 2013, there existed 
460 private security companies, 28,639 employees with 20,234 firearms registered.118 
Bilateral arrangements with the UN or the United States have tried to address the 
deficiencies of the PNC, but they have had little effect.119  
Table 1. FAES budget as percent GDP through the peace accords, 1988–1996120 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Percent GDP 4.5 4.6 3.7 3.3 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 
 
The period of democratization put the FAES through a difficult transition. The 
military fought ardently to maintain some level of control during the negotiations. The 
process of civilianization would take time, and actors in the military would learn it was to 
their benefit to follow ONUSAL mandated changes. As Cañas and Dada state, “time 
must pass before the old institution stops producing antibodies to this new organ.”121 Yet 
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other actors in the state were all-too-interested in resurrecting the military into a 
functional political weapon in their fight against crime. 
2. Crime and Punishment 
The crime wave that plagued post-conflict El Salvador came largely from external 
circumstances, but later assumed a uniquely violent character owing to the Salvadoran 
response.122 First, in an effort to crackdown on gang membership in Los Angeles and other 
dangerous U.S. gang-cities, the United States deported thousands of Salvadoran migrants 
with criminal histories and suspected gang affiliations.123 The importation into El Salvador 
of gangsters with criminal training and transnational networks quickly led to the 
institutionalization of the two main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18, in addition to 
countless other pandillas. Bruneau states that these early deportations “unquestionably 
influenced the dynamic and style of the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street Gang as they 
emerged in the region, but those and subsequent deportations are not the reason gangs have 
taken such a hold on these societies.”124  
Tables 2 and 3 capture the scope of the deportations to Northern Triangle countries 
from both the United States and Mexico. 
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Table 2. Northern triangle deportations via air from the USA,  
2007–2012125 
Deportations 
via air from 
the USA 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Guatemalans 23,062 28,051 27,222 29,095 30,885 40,647 
Hondurans 29,348 30,018 25,101 22,878 22,415 32,240 
Salvadorans 20,111 20,203 19,209 18,734 16,759 19,685 
Total 72,521 78,272 71,532 70,707 70,059 95,572 
 





2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Guatemalans 49,745 35,546 28,786 28,090 31,427 
Hondurans 31,193 27,866 23,063 23,247 33,519 
Salvadorans 16,678 12,999 10,534 10,643 8,944 
Total 97,346 77,411 62,383 61,980 73,890 
The repatriated members of Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18 have settled in and 
permeated Salvadoran society, and have acted like corrosive seawater on the state 
machinery. Moreover, the transnational nature of the criminal networks these gangs 
possess has made them a natural conductor of drug trafficking on its way from South 
America and the Caribbean into Mexico and the United States. The profits from this 
illicit activity have made these maras, in addition to the various other outlying pandillas, 
forces to be reckoned with by the state. As the violence concentrated around the drug 
trade intensifies, so did the general level of violence.127 Gangs have diversified their 
portfolio of activity to include extortion, kidnapping, murder, arms trafficking, human 
trafficking, and other criminal endeavors. Sullivan argues that maras have morphed from 
traditional street gangs that battle for turf into “a new third generation that combines 
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political and mercenary aims… [possessing] many of the organizational and operational 
attributes found with net-based triads, cartels and terrorist entities.”128 
In this vein, the ARENA Party presidents Francisco Guillermo Flores Pérez  
(who is incidentally currently evading Salvadoran extradition in Panama for corruption 
charges as of October 2014) and Antonio Saca heavily politicized the campaign against 
crime. As an effort to shift public attention away from socio-economic elements that 
ARENA could do little to affect, the party preyed on the public apprehension of domestic 
insecurity.129 Torres-Rivas argues that El Salvador entered a “new era of contradictions... 
Nothing is the same in the political ARENA, but the socio-economic conditions that 
provoked the military conflict still exist, only in a democratic setting.”130 Political 
conservatives made electoral promises with little thought as to how the FAES would rise 
to the challenge. 
In brief, mano dura policies, in Holland’s words, are the “introduction of 
discretionary crimes, diluted due process guarantees, and military participation in 
policing... formal measures that open the door to informal police abuse.”131 From an 
institutional perspective, these policies were developed by the conservative right of the 
ARENA Party to form a much broader political base.132 However, these policies resulted 
in no reduction in domestic insecurity—quite the opposite.133 Holland presents the two 
phases of mano dura in El Salvador. The first phase began with an emergency law passed 
in 1996 to expedite the judicial process against suspected criminals, to raise minimum 
sentences for non-violent and minor crimes, to authorize the army to accompany the PNC 
on patrols, to allow juvenile delinquents to serve with adults, and to make criminal “illicit 
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association.”134 These reforms were repealed several months later, but a precedent was 
set. Just before President Flores left office, another emergency decree, Plan Mano Dura, 
passed in 2003 that re-enacted several of the previous measures. Gang membership was 
now illegal, the military and police conducted joint sweeps, and the state’s power to 
arrest and detain suspects strengthened.135 Flores’ successor, President Saca, pushed his 
security forces to intensify their crackdown in Plan Super Mano Dura. These policies 
radicalized the El Salvador’s security state and criminal activity.136 Domestic insecurity 
and the government crackdown fed a vicious circle. El Salvador waged war against the 
gangs, petty crime, and drugs; instead of sending death squads, politicians enacted mano 
dura policies that further exacerbated citizen insecurity. Cruz summarizes the dilemma 
faced by El Salvador well: “anti-gang crackdowns were conducted by institutions riddled 
with corruption, which not only exacerbated the illegitimate use of force but also 
contributed to the establishment of underground criminal networks originating from the 
very top of the institutions.”137 
When the ARENA Party, having failed to reduce citizen insecurity with mano 
dura policies, could no longer paint the FMLN as irresponsible dreamers, and when the 
FMLN ran a middle-of-the-road candidate for president (Mauricio Funes, a popular 
newscaster and member of the FMLN political party, but not a former guerrilla), the 
FMLN finally triumphed at the polls. Civil-military relations and militarization under the 
Funes Administration is the point of departure for further analysis. 
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III. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ASSESSMENT 
Before assessing the current state of civil-military relations in El Salvador, it is 
important to note that the field is considerably difficult to qualify, let alone quantify. Data 
on force strength or defense budgets conveys part of the picture, but leaves much to be 
desired. This evaluation relies heavily on military force strength and economic data from 
various sources, and the results of scholarly review and reports in El Salvador. I draw on 
other sources such as media reports to illustrate my findings, but regrettably, the results 
are thus limited. 
A. EFFECTIVENESS 
Salvadoran military effectiveness is measured by ascertaining whether the FAES 
accomplish the roles and missions assigned to them.138 The first piece to understanding 
effectiveness in the Salvadoran context is identifying the roles and missions. Article 212 
of the 1983 Constitution charges the FAES with “ensuring the defense of the sovereignty 
of the state and territorial integrity, maintaining peace, tranquility and public security, 
and the execution of the constitution and other active laws.”139 Legally committing the 
FAES to both internal and external security roles is unique to the region and Latin 
America at large.140 For the purposes of this argument, whether the military is thus 
institutionally over-committed is irrelevant; the Salvadoran military is evaluated based on 
its roles defined in the Salvadoran Constitution. Returning to the role of the military, it is 
two-fold: internal and external security. In the geopolitical sense, the external mission of 
the Salvadoran military is the defense of Salvadoran sovereignty from the aggression of 
neighbor states. Considering the defense structures of other Central American countries, 
and the recent surge in border defense and urban security spending throughout the region, 
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El Salvador is on par with its immediate neighbors.141 Table 4 summarizes 2012 defense 
spending and force size in Central America. What is more, the perception of threat in the 
region is low—that is to say, the regional powers have focused their combat force 
towards other contemporary threats rather than geopolitical intrigue. For instance, the 
Soccer War of 1969 with Honduras has been the only external armed conflict that El 
Salvador has participated in since 1907. Yet El Salvador has fought two major civil wars, 
one in 1932 and another in the 1980s.142 El Salvador has followed the traditional Latin 
American pattern of relying on external legal organizations like the Organization of 
American States and the World Court to marginalize the legitimacy of interstate armed 
conflict.143 
Table 4. Defense spending and relative force size in Central America, 2012144 
 
Defense 
Spending      
(U.S. $ m) 
Defense 
Spending      
(% GDP) 
Troop Levels                             
(000s) 
Armed 
Forces Reserves Paramilitaries 
Guatemala 212 .42 17 64 25 
Belize 16 1.04 1 1 0 
Honduras 151 .83 12 60 8 
El Salvador 145 .61 15 10 17 
Costa Rica 349 .78 0 0 10 
Nicaragua 66 .84 12 0 0 
Panama 551 1.58 0 0 12 
While many of these contemporary threats to Salvadoran sovereignty come from 
transnational entities, such as transnational gangs and drug trafficking flows, these threats 
are manifested as internal threats without borders. The Salvadoran military has not been 
able to stem the tide of these external threats. 
                                                 
141 The sharpest rise in defense spending in Latin America came from Mexico and Central America—by 
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142 Centeno, Blood and Debt, 44–6. 
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Another dimension of El Salvador’s external role is the international status of the 
FAES. To the credit of the Salvadoran military, they have maintained an international 
presence in multinational coalition forces and UN peacekeeping missions. Since 1995, El 
Salvador has had military observers in Western Sahara. In 2003, El Salvador was the only 
Latin American nation to support the United States in a coalition of the willing for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom—a force that stayed in Iraq until the end of the conflict. Since 
2012, a Salvadoran infantry battalion has served in Afghanistan. El Salvador currently 
has military observers or peacekeepers in the Western Sahara, Afghanistan, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Liberia, South Sudan, Lebanon, and Haiti.145 Perla and Cruz-Feliciano argue 
that these actions are part of El Salvador’s larger strategy of conciliation toward the 
United States.146 By maintaining an international presence, the Salvadoran military, aside 
from advancing in the areas of professionalism and reputation, has earned the respect of 
important allies in the United Nations—most notably the United States. I argue that by 
participating in multinational missions, even when the country suffers through a good 
deal of domestic adversity, El Salvador has secured a degree of legitimacy and mutual 
support in their external mission. Considering the FAES’s ability to defend their 
territorial integrity and unique willingness to participate in multinational missions, I 
consider the external role of the Salvadoran military effective. 
El Salvador’s effectiveness in the face of their internal mission is a different story 
entirely. As already mentioned, transnational threats that permeate borders manifest as 
internal threats. In the reforms to the constitution after the peace accord, only certain 
articles were altered to give the responsibility of public security to the PNC; the change 
called for Salvadoran military action in cases of emergency.147 Yet during the 
reorganizing years, the government already took false steps by delaying the curtailment 
of military forces in some cases, and in others, merely re-labeled military units to 
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continue operating in the civilian context.148 As early as 1993—early relative to the peace 
accords—President Cristiani ordered the military to patrol highways and join the 
fledgling PNC on routine patrols.149 During the mano dura regimes, these military patrols 
went from emergent to routine. Under extreme pressure to act in the face of outrageous 
crime levels, President Funes passed a decree in 2009 that extended the policing mission 
of the FAES—incidentally a decree that was recently upheld by El Salvador’s high court 
in April 2014.150 In 2009 he assigned some 2,000 additional soldiers to assist the PNC: 
1,000 more in 2010, a bump to 3,500 in 2011, and by mid-2013, 6,300 troops—half the 
army.151 Has the increase in troop levels generated a higher level of citizen security in El 
Salvador? 
Unfortunately, the presence of the military in these urban situations has not 
reduced crime. It is a non-sequitur to say that the presence of the Salvadoran military on 
these patrols has actually escalated the level of criminal violence in El Salvador, but their 
presence has not mitigated the problem. Looking at a specific example, the Salvadoran 
legislature passed a decree in 2010 that ordered the FAES to deploy to Salvadoran 
prisons in an effort to sanitize what was perceived to be a quickly deteriorating 
situation.152 While the military presence may have looked good on the front page La 
Prensa Gráfica, their presence did nothing to bring down cases of extortion and criminal 
cell phone usage inside the prisons; in fact, the presence of the armed forces tightened 
prison access and obscured any level of transparency. Further, having the military in 
charge of the grossly inadequate prison system puts the FAES in a position where 
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mistakes can happen. For instance, the Amnesty International Ombudsman for human 
rights in El Salvador received several reports in 2011 that military personnel had 
conducted illegal vaginal and anal searches of female Salvadorans visiting the prisons.153 
Again, leveling charges of malicious involvement on the part of the military is obtuse and 
inappropriate; however, it is clear that this particular internal mission was a failure. I 
assess the internal role of the FAES to be ineffective. 
Considering the two-part role assigned to the Salvadoran military by the 
constitution, both internal and external, I argue that the failure of the internal role is the 
larger problem. While the internal mission is nearly impossible considering the limited 
resources of a legitimizing state, I nevertheless assess that the Salvadoran military has not 
yet achieved the degree of effectiveness necessary for a healthy trinity of civil-military 
relations. 
B. EFFICIENCY 
Efficiency is measured by how accountable the armed forces are to their civilian 
overseers in terms of their use of resources.154 Efficiency is often a more difficult metric 
to attain than effectiveness in that it requires careful management. As Matei argues, 
“launching numerous expensive missiles at a single target and destroying it ‘multiple 
times’ is clearly effective but not an efficient use of resources.”155 In this assessment, 
resources are El Salvador’s efficient use of its service members is largely subjective. The 
most comprehensive assessment involves reviewing the numbers of combat deaths with 
reference to the whole, a review of the professional development of members of the 
armed forces against those in the private sector, and an evaluation of how military 
personnel are utilized at their varying fields within the service. It suffices to say, this 
evaluation is nearly impossible. 
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The FAES, however, has experienced a resurgence of trust both domestically and 
internationally. With the elevated crime levels and the apparent impotency of the PNC to 
manage the problem, popular support for the FAES internal security mission jumped over 
20 percentage points from 2008 to 2009 when President Funes announced the FAES’s 
new role with street patrols.156 The involvement of the FAES abroad since 1995 at least 
suggests a not entirely insular mission. Both Military Balance and Jane’s suggested that 
Salvadoran units that served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon were well-regarded and 
have kept El Salvador “at the fore of modern warfare.”157 In terms of their internal role, 
the Salvadoran military has a good deal of experience with counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations from the recent struggle against the FMLN. COIN is relevant in the current 
fight against domestic insecurity vis-à-vis clandestine drug activities in both urban and 
rural settings. The tanda of commanding officers now were the junior officers on the 
front lines during the civil war, which suggests an institutionalization of COIN tactics. 
As another measure of efficiency within the military, the level of corruption is 
also considered. The term corruption has certainly proliferated in more recent literature 
on Central America, and as such, has been used liberally to describe both causal factors 
and results of public insecurity in the region. Perhaps there has been an insufficient study 
of corruption within the FAES, but I have found nothing concerning the matter outside a 
few individual reports or unsubstantiated observations.158 At the same time, there is a 
great deal of consensus on the high levels of corruption in the PNC and other rungs of 
government.159 
In terms of the military budget, the Salvadoran military’s optimal and most 
efficient use of the money entrusted to it is perhaps easier to evaluate. The Salvadoran 
military budget was heavily slashed as the ink dried on the Chapultepec Peace Accords, 
yet perhaps more detrimental to the military budget was Salvadoran stalled economic 
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growth in the early 2000s and the 2008 global economic crisis.160 Yet even as resources 
dwindle, the Salvadoran military has shown a resiliency in making effective use of the 
equipment given to them. El Salvador’s Joint Chief of Staff General Acosta stated that 
the military would “operate with what we have.”161 The Salvadoran Army is described in 
Jane’s Defence Weekly thusly: 
The army has a core force of 18 understrength infantry battalions assigned 
to six brigade-level military zones across the country. These are generally 
equipped with 1980s civil war-era weapons, radios and vehicles. The joint 
Army Special Forces Command, created in 2006 with headquarters 
outside the capitol of San Salvador, controls five company-strength special 
forces (SF) units and the Parachute Battalion. With better equipment and 
training, including interaction with U.S. and other foreign forces, these are 
the most capable elements of the armed forces.162 
The article goes on to say that the Salvadoran Navy makes do with patrol craft to interdict 
go-fast boats that typically refuel alongside larger ships in drug runs through Salvadoran 
waters. Lastly, the Salvadoran Air Force relies on civil war era Huey helicopters and used 
Cessna A-37B Dragonflies (replacements recently acquired from Chile in 2013) for 
close-air COIN support.163 
On balance, considering the tightly constrained nature of the Salvadoran military 
budget, determined year-to-year in the Ministry of Defense and the legislature, and also 
considering the highly professional and resilient nature of the military’s force 
composition, I assess the FAES to meet the metric of efficiency. The Salvadoran military 
budget jumped by roughly 37 percent while its force composition remained constant 
under the Funes Administration.164 In addition to increasing spending on his social 
programs, Funes raised taxes on the wealthy—wildly unpopular toward the end of his 
administration—to boost FAES spending levels.165 These figures suggest a preventative 
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approach to military corruption whereby service member salaries, benefits, and 
equipment see at least marginal improvement. Newly inaugurated President Sánchez 
Cerén pledged—along with a more socio-economic approach—that the FAES would 
continue to support the PNC in the fight against insecurity.166 Whether Cerén’s 
administration will make headway in the fight against crime is for anybody to decide, but 
it appears that his use of the military will not diverge significantly with that of his 
predecessor.167 
C. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL 
Determining the extent of democratic civilian control as the third pillar of the 
CCMR’s civil-military trinity involves an assessment of the following four areas: 1) the 
MOD, 2) the legislature, 3) interagency capacity, and 4) an intelligence apparatus that 
supports both the MOD and the legislature. 
1. MOD 
The MOD is here assessed using Pion-Berlin’s framework: 1) a mostly civilian 
ministry (with a civilian minister) that 2) organizes and equips the military; 3) derives 
tactics, operations, and strategies; 4) widens the organizational distance between the 
military brass and the civilians in charge; and 5) divides power amongst the various 
services within the armed forces.168 With regard to the civilian influence within the 
military, the current minister of defense is General (then Colonel) David Munguía Payés, 
resurrected from forced retirement in 2009, by President Funes. Although he is the first 
non-active duty officer to head the ministry, he is still seen wearing his uniform in La  
 
                                                 
166 Fernando Romero, “Concertar para mejor economía y seguridad,” La Prensa Gráfica, June 2, 
2014, page 2. 
167 “Inauguration of New President in El Salvador Unlikely to Bring Major Policy Shift, Army 
Deployed Against Gangs,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, June 2, 2014, 2. 
168 Cited earlier, Pion-Berlin, “Latin American Civil-Military Relations,” 74–5. 
 47
Prensa Gráfica.169 As of 2006, the MOD had “no civilian presence.”170 As of the latest 
FLACSO report (2013), “although El Salvador leads Central America in the level of 
technical competence within the ministry (possessing both a permanent advisory staff and 
military advisors), there is still no civilian technical experts.”171 As the defense budget is 
released by the legislature on an annual basis, the MOD does not participate in any long-
range strategic military planning. The onus of strategy is still with the Salvadoran Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.172 Although El Salvador has made the largest democratic advances by 
publishing three defense white papers since 1998, the MOD still has a relatively low level 
of responsibilities: assisting in promotions and demotions whereas the military takes on 
responsibility for troop deployment, infrastructure, doctrine, training, and management of 
human resources.”173 As such, the MOD fails to insulate the executive and other sources 
of state power from the military. 
The MOD also fails to divide and conquer military power by engendering 
competition between the different services. Since 1979, the Salvadoran Army has made 
up an average 91 percent of FAES total manpower.174 When considering the low tech 
nature of the military’s very few naval and air force platforms, and that the other services 
only conduct support operations for the army’s mission areas, I conclude that the army 
dominates the MOD, and more importantly, the military. Overall, the Salvadoran MOD 
may be one of the more progressively democratic ministries in Central America, 
however, it still does not exhibit strong characteristics of democratic civilian control. 
2. Legislature 
The assessment of the legislature will be done using the conditions put forth by 
Agüero: 1) policy enactment without military interference; 2) definition of military 
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objectives and overall organization of defense; 3) formulation of defense policy; and  
4) oversight of defense policy implementation.175 The National Assembly, with support 
or prodding from the executive, has largely achieved control over military policy. The 
military is charged with internal and external defense by the constitution, but it is up to 
the legislature to authorize the incremental use of military force in the domestic ARENA. 
The degree to which the legislature serves as a rubber stamp to the executive is another 
argument, but in the case of El Salvador, the military under the Funes Administration was 
directed to assume a quickly growing role in domestic security; at present, again, half of 
the Salvadoran Army is deployed in the country in a security posture, much to the dismay 
of army top brass that have tried to restore their conventional role since the end of the 
civil war.176 Additionally, the National Assembly controls constitutional prerogatives 
such as the power to declare peace or war, deploy troops, declare states of emergency, 
revise and approve budgets, approve presidential appointments, draft bills, and formally 
request information—directly from the MOD, if necessary.177 There is nothing that 
restricts the legislature from formulating defense policy, but one must consider that the 
military budget is based on the prior year’s expenditure. As noted earlier, the FAES 
maintains relative autonomy regarding long term strategy. However, the two have come 
to loggerheads over the issue of internal security, and it appears that the legislative 
mandate that the military fulfill internal security missions has prevailed. While the top 
brass still controls how the defense budget is spent, to include the responsibility of 
defense organization, the legislature has achieved civilian control over mission definition 
and policy formulation. 
As far as defining mission success, the legislature is lacking. First the legislature 
has very little technical support regarding military issues.178 Even if the legislature 
understood how to assess mission completion, however, there is little reason to believe 
they could agree on anything: as of July 2013, the Salvadoran National Assembly was 
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highly fragmented: 39 percent ARENA, 37 percent FMLN, 13 percent GLAN, 7 percent 
PCN, and 3 percent other.179 This will, of course, change over time—especially if 
President Cerén rises to the occasion—but my current assessment is that the definition of 
success remains illusory. As far as legislative oversight over defense activities, El 
Salvador—like Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico—have a defense specific commission 
within the National Assembly. That said, this committee possesses no permanent staff, 
which means knowledge is lost with high turnover.180 As such, the National Assembly is 
only as effective at evaluating the armed forces as their best lineup in the assembly, 
which is, again, an unlikely situation. Further, under the Funes Administration, the 
legislature has been either unwilling or incapable of ceasing the president’s continual use 
of the FAES to support the public security role, a power the Salvadoran Constitution 
grants the National Assembly.181 In summary, I assess that the legislature has achieved 
the upper hand of the military in three of four of Agüero’s criteria. 
3. Interagency 
Interagency cooperation is assessed as a close link among the various entities that 
report to and receive orders from the state: that the executive has an appropriate forum in 
which to formulate defense policy and have access to fair and expert consultation of 
military affairs. El Salvador does possess a National Advisory Council, the Consejo de 
Seguridad Nacional (CSNP), created in 1992, that reports directly to the president.182 
The CSNP seemed to function well through the 2000s. Based on the Salvadoran response 
to threats received from terrorists in 2005, Bruneau and Matei assert that “El Salvador is 
an excellent case study of a country that perceived a threat, in this case from international 
terrorism, and concluded that it had to create an NSC to most effectively respond to the 
threat.”183 However, as of 2006, this council is not supported by a ministerial strategic 
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planning unit within the MOD.184 In other words, the president receives direct advice 
from and formulates defense policy with his active duty generals. The irregular national 
security practices of President Mauricio Funes are covered in greater detail in the case 
analyses in Chapter V. 
4. Intelligence Support 
Bruneau states that part of democratic civilian control is that the intelligence 
sector obeys and supports the functions of the legislature and the MOD. Many Central 
American countries possess highly effective intelligence units, holdovers from decades of 
locating and weeding out malcontents within their borders. In El Salvador, both death 
squads and the corrupt state police services utilized military intelligence.185 The 
Chapultepec Peace Accords dismantled the military National Intelligence Directorate and 
created the Salvadoran State Intelligence Body (OIE) to be operated under civilian 
management and to report to the executive.186 The OIE, for instance, does not answer to 
any ministry, including the MOD, but rather reports directly to the executive.187 The OIE 
has the ability to synthesize intelligence and form reports or other materials, but the 
organization does not coordinate with any other state agency when advising the 
president.188 In terms of legislative control, the OIE is answerable to the National 
Assembly per the law.189 Yet, in practice the National Assembly has neither created 
regulations over intelligence activities nor acted to assert control over said activities.190 In 
sum, the OIE may choose to support the MOD and the legislature, but nothing enforces 
this behavior. 
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5. Summary 
Table 5 summarizes my assessment of civil-military relations in El Salvador. In 
terms of effectiveness, while the FAES has an adequate force structure to protect its 
sovereignty, and has participated in several multinational coalitions, they have failed to 
improve public security within El Salvador. Whether this should be a mission area for the 
FAES is for another argument, but as they have been tasked with internal security, this 
assessment charges that they have not yet effectively fulfilled this duty. In terms of 
efficiency, expressed here as the efficient use of manpower and capital, the FAES has 
performed superbly. El Salvador has efficiently used limited resources during the 
military’s downsizing; unfortunately, as expressed in the evaluation of effectiveness, the 
role assigned to the FAES is likely too large. Finally, democratic civilian control of the 
military is assessed of not having yet been achieved. While the Salvadoran legislature 
exercises control over defense policy, they lack the appropriate levels of oversight. 
Meanwhile, El Salvador’s MOD fulfills none of the requirements of this analysis for 
democratic civilian control. In sum, based on the analysis of this chapter, civil-military 
control of El Salvador during the Funes Administration does not meet the requirements of 
the CCMR trinity.  
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Table 5. Trinity assessment of civil military relations in El Salvador191 
                                                 
191 Author’s own findings. 
  Yes No 
Effectiveness 
     External X   
     Internal X 
  Overall   X 
Efficiency 
     Manpower X   
     Budget X 
  Overall X   
democratic civilian control 
     MOD     
        Civilianized   X 
        Manages defense 
          objectives 
  X 
        Organizes and equips   X 
        Facilitates organizational 
          distance to civilian power 
  X 
        Divides and dominates 
          military services 
  X 
     Legislature     
        Policy enactment without 
          interference of military 
X   
        Defines objectives and 
          organizes defense 
X   
        Formulates defense policy X   
        Oversight X 
  Overall      X 
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IV. MILITARIZATION ASSESSMENT 
Militarization in El Salvador is a persistent theme throughout its history. This 
chapter assesses the current deployment of FAES troops based on some quantitative and 
qualitative metrics, provides context with a survey of the period of analysis (2009–2014), 
and makes a few general observations based on the assessment. 
A. MEASURING MILITARIZATION 
1. Quantitative Metrics 
As discussed earlier, in terms of quantitative data, part of the metric to capture 
militarization encompasses the size of the military force relative to the population. 
According to the Salvadoran Constitution, military service is compulsory for all able-
bodied males age eighteen to thirty.192 Bowman measures militarization as the “size of 
the military budget as a percent of GDP and the number of soldiers per thousand 
inhabitants.”193 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate Bowman’s metrics for militarization for the Northern 
Triangle countries of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador). In terms 
of defense spending (Figure 1), both El Salvador and Guatemala held high sustained 
levels during the years of conflict, and then an abrupt drop-off afterwards. It may also be 
observed that while Guatemala and Honduras reached levels of defense spending less 
than one percent of GDP in the 2000s, El Salvador never dipped below this level. The 
same general trend may be observed for percent participation (Figure 2). The FAES saw 
a steep reduction in force levels from 1992 to 1994—from sixteen percent participation to 
roughly six percent—and then a gradual reduction to about four percent participation at 
the start of the Funes Administration. The data demonstrates that Funes boosted levels of 
percent participation back up to roughly five-and-a-half percent. 
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All said, however, the data is overwhelming, and does little to explain the specific 
case of El Salvador. Certainly, most of Central America—and even Latin America—has 
gone through similar trends in terms of military dictatorships and domestic strife. 
Another deficiency of these metrics is that exact reported values are not known. These 
figures also do not account for the unknown numbers of territorial defense forces, 
mercenary paramilitaries, nor uncounted guerrillas. For analysis of militarization in El 
Salvador, I move beyond just quantitative metrics. 
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Figure 2. Northern Triangle of Central America population and percent military 
participation, 1988–2013195 
2. Images of Militarization 
On the other end of the spectrum from quantitative metrics, in terms of measuring 
militarization, is archival evidence and photography. This section explores Salvadoran 
troop deployments visually relative to its recent civil war history. The so-called Libro 
Amarillo, published by the Salvadoran intelligence apparatus during the civil war, 
features pages upon pages of black and white photographs not unlike an old high school 
year book. After every ten pages of photos are tables listing the full names of those 
photographed; their pseudonyms, if any; their organization; and their rank or activity, 
such as político, combatiente, miembro, or ideólogo. No information is listed as to their 
records or suspected activities, and many of the photographs are so obscured and 
whitewashed as to not be useful at all for the purposes of finding a suspected guerrilla. 
This was the Salvadoran state in 1987: through contacts in all departments and localities 
all throughout El Salvador, the state security apparatus was able to construct and 
distribute a comprehensive—strictly in terms of sheer volume—listing of 1,915 suspected 
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enemies of the state. On the list was President Salvador Sánchez Cerén; others were 
human rights defenders, labor leaders, and political leaders. Many on the list were 
illegally detained, some were tortured, others, extra-judicially executed, and still more 
disappeared. Written by hand on the archived copy released to the public 28 September 
2014 is the note: “Que lo usen, sacar fotocopias de las fotografías y ponerlo en 
boletinero para que conozcan a sus enemigos.” (“Use it, make copies of the photographs 
and put them on your bulletin board so you will know your enemies.”)196 Quite an 
elaborate militarized network is required to generate such a hit-list. Owing largely to the 
ability of the Salvadoran military-security complex to delve deep down into the 
countryside—the ungoverned spaces, a place where many countries struggle to assert 
their presence—the military discerned friend from foe. Naturally, many of those on the 
list were guilty by association, victims of mistaken identity, or merely unfriendly to the 
wrong people in their respective departments. 
For a look at the climate of militarization in El Salvador from 2009–2014, many 
of the photographs featured in La Presna Gráfica, El Salvador’s moderately conservative 
and independent national daily owned by the Dutriz Group, give prominence to the surge 
in crime in El Salvador.197 Many of these photographs show PNC officers and staff 
cordoning off crime scenes and conducting preliminary investigations while wearing ski 
masks for their own protection. Others show PNC officers and Salvadoran soldiers, 
similarly protected with either ski masks or photo correction, carrying automatic rifles, as 
they conduct military-style patrols through San Salvador or searches in the outlying 
departments. These photos reflect a country at war with itself again, but this time against 
poverty and crime. In other words, El Salvador’s legacy of militarization has prepared 
                                                 
196 Transcription and translation provided on the George Washington Archive webpage; the photos 
described can be viewed by downloading the pdf at the following link; 
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contemporary Salvadorans for the level of violence they see today; instead of the state 
influencing conscript peasantry in the fields, the gangs attract the young urban poor. 
 
 
Figure 3. Photos and descriptions from Libro Amarillo198 
 
                                                 




Figure 4. Sampling of PNC and FAES images from La Prensa Gráfica, 2012–
2014199 
 
                                                 
199 Images taken from La Prensa Gráfica online, from left to right, top to bottom: Ricardo Flores and 
Jessel Santos, “FAES buscará padilleros en 10 municipios,” 14 December 2012; Gloria Flores and Jessel 
Santos, “Fin de semana se registraron 25 asesinatos en El Salvador,” 10 November 2014; Loida Martínez 
Avelar, “Sacerdote critica más militares en las calles,” 17 March 2014; Jessel Santos, M. Bolaños, H. 
Rivas, and M. Salguero, “Aumentan homicidios multiples en el país,” 15 April 2014; and Jessel Santos, 
“Pandillas buscan infiltrar FAES y PNC: Perdomo,” 6 May 2014. 
 
 59
The following historical survey provides context to the current state of 
militarization in El Salvador from 2009–2014. Why did President Funes promise more 
FAES troops on the streets and why did this initially meet with mass public approval? 
How has the high levels of militarization in the past, as seen in the Libro Amarillo, for 
example, affected the younger generation in El Salvador? 
B. FMLN LEADERSHIP UNDER PRESIDENT FUNES: 2009–2014 
El Salvador, with its large population relative to its size, is more than ever a 
victim of urbanization. Large crowds of unemployed and underutilized youths stagnate 
around the centers of power in El Salvador. Into this potentially volatile mix—instead of 
guerrilla rhetoric or fervor for land reform—gang violence and transnational crime have 
made inroads to the extent that the state is at odds over what to do next. According to the 
2013 UNODC Global Homicide Report, risk factors for high levels of lethal violence 
include “unemployment, poor standards of education, the presence of youth gangs and 
organized crime, poverty and inequality, and accessibility to firearms.”200 
The PNC, the policing force charged with maintaining internal security, has failed 
in its mission. These shortcomings have manifested themselves in a general level of 
impunity for crime and high levels of corruption within the PNC. Ávalos refers to 
corruption within the PNC as its own “original sin: the inclusion of former soldiers that 
worked with criminal groups and preserved a closed power structure that prevented any 
authority from investigating them for over two decades... [allowing] criminal bands formed 
in the 1980s as weapon or drug smugglers to forge connections with the PNC and to 
develop into sophisticated drug trafficking organizations.”201 While President Cerén ran 
and won office on a platform of anticorruption, concerns about corruption are not as strong 
                                                 
200 “Global Study on Homicide 2013,” 25. 
201 Héctor Silva Ávalos, “Corruption in El Salvador,” Working paper for Center for Latin American 
and Latino Studies, March 2014, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419174, 2. 
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in El Salvador as they are in other Northern Triangle countries.202 For example, former 
Salvadoran President Francisco Flores was arrested in September 2014 and is awaiting trial 
for embezzling some $15 million from Taiwan while in office; it is possible that 
Salvadoran citizens think that at least something is being done to fight corruption. Even 
still, the most recent Congressional Research Service report provided to Congress alleges 
that corruption is one of the major challenges facing El Salvador.203 Corrupt or not, the 
PNC has been unable to cope with the mounting wave a crime, and with resources 
stretched thin, is unable to prosecute individual investigations the way they should be. 
Table 6. Salvadoran homicides and homicide rates per 100,000 people,  
2009–2013204 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Homicides 4382 4004 4371 2594 2499 
Rate per 
100,000 71.2 64.8 70.3 41.5 39.7 
 
The problem of gang violence is the largest single national security challenge to 
the Salvadoran state. Central America saw declining homicide rates from 1995 to 2004, 
but this trend dramatically reversed in 2007. This has resulted in one of the highest sub-
regional homicide rates in the world (26.5 percent per 100,000 people in 2012).205 Since 
Mexico escalated its war on the Mexican drug cartels in 2006, illicit drug flows ballooned 
significantly in Northern Triangle countries: Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. 
Many Mexican cartels have shifted parts of their operations to Central America under the 
cognizance of, or association with, local maras, operating with higher levels of 
impunity.206 
                                                 
202 “Central America: Leaders Promote Anticorruption Efforts with Mixed Results,” Open Source 
Center, 11 November 2014. 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/2976
0999/CorruptionNorthernTriangle_11Nov14_Final.pdf, 4. 
203 Seelke, El Salvador, 10. 
204 “Situación de la Seguridad,” 4. 
205 “Global Study on Homicide 2013,” 33. The countries cited as to having contributed the most to 
this sub-regional homicide rate were El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Jamaica. 
206 Latin America: Regional Overview,” The Economist Intelligence Unit. September 2014, 6. 
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The question posed to President Mauricio Funes at the outset of his election was 
what to do about the problem. The FMLN is a liberal party, so social programs as a long-
term solution to citizen insecurity was expected. Yet it would take time for social 
programs to result in anything tangible. Meanwhile gang violence and PNC ineffective 
left no safe harbor for social programs to take root. A dramatic measure was required, 
and so Funes turned to the military. 
 
Figure 5. Ex-president Mauricio Funes207 
The precedent of using the armed forces to provide citizen security while the 
national and local police units professionalized was already set by Mexico in their war on 
drugs. Sotomayor argues that militarization in the 2000s in Central America was an 
                                                 




unintended consequence, or spillover effect, of the Mexican Drug War, in which the 
Mexican state heavily utilized their armed forces as the front line against the drug cartels 
entrenched in Mexico.208 Yet putting the armed forces back on the streets is a troubling 
step for a country that had so relatively recently fought a civil war. Doyle describes the 
dilemma as follows: 
On one hand, there appear to be few options to deal with pronounced 
lawlessness in parts of the country, especially given the insufficient 
numbers of PNC, their inexperience, and lack of specialized training. On 
the other hand, this precedent seriously challenges one of the most critical 
aspects of the constitutional reforms resulting from the entire peace 
process—that of permanently removing the military from internal security 
functions.209 
Funes made good on his electoral promise, and the FAES has accompanied PNC 
patrols in San Salvador since 2009. The progression of President Mauricio Funes’ 
reliance on the Salvadoran Army patrols has been astounding; in his first year in office he 
increased the number of effectives by 259 percent (from 1,975 to 6,500 soldiers).210 The 
count of soldiers committed to internal security in 2014 has reached 11,200 effectives—a 
467 percent increase since the FMLN party took office (Figure 6).211 Funes’ use of the 
PNC and Salvadoran Army effectives is covered in more detail in Chapter V. 
                                                 
208 Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico,” 49. 
209 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 209. 
210 “Situación de la Seguridad,” 90. 
211 Percentage computed from data presented in Gráfico 3.1 in “Situación de la Seguridad,” 90. See 
also Figure 9 in Chapter V of this thesis. 
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Figure 6. Soldiers assigned to public security, 2006–2014212 
 
Figure 7. Salvadoran homicide rate per 100,000 people, 1990–2013213 
 
                                                 
212 Data provided by the Ministry of Defense (2006–12) and the Office of the President (2013–14) 
and found in “Situación de la Seguridad,” 90. 
213 “Situación de la Seguridad,” 3. 
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Aside from deploying FAES troops to the streets, President Funes oversaw 
another innovation meant to improve citizen security.214 The gang truce that lasted from 
2012–14 was an unofficially initiated event in which the state—via military and religious 
leaders—negotiated terms with an extra-state entity in order to stabilize the escalating 
violence in the region. According to UNODC statistics, shortly after the gang truce, El 
Salvador’s homicide rate dropped 40 percent, in addition to the general level of crime 
dropping.215 Yet with the end of the truce in mid-2013, levels of violence again spiked. 
The gang truce is also covered more closely in Chapter V. 
 
Figure 8. Rates of selected crimes, El Salvador, 2007–2013216 
                                                 
214 President Funes has denied any involvement with the planning of the gang truce, but he never did 
anything to hinder the government’s complicity in the truce, especially once more favorable crime statistics 
were produced. See Geoff Thale, Joseph Bateman, and Ana Goerdt, “One Year into the Gang Truce in El 
Salvador: Can the Funes Administration Turn the Fragile Truce into Sustainable Public Policy?” 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 26 April 26 2013, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/WOLA/elSalvador/1year_gangTruce.pdf , 2. 
215 “Global Study on Homicide 2013,” 34. 
216 Data provided by the National Police of El Salvador, found in “Global Study on Homicide 2013,” 
46.  
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El Salvador is now witnessing the bitter harvest of their civil war combined with 
the uncontrollable influence of transnational criminal profits. How does one gauge 
militarization amongst the urban slums? These urban poor have not been utilized or 
militarized by the state as with previous generations. Yet since the signing of the peace 
accords in 1992 and the dismantling of much of the FAES, the military has actively 
maintained a toehold in El Salvador. For example, the military reinvigorated their 
infrastructural, public health, and literacy programs, while entering into new 
environmental conservation and reforestation projects. As Walter and Williams assert, 
“On the one hand, the military’s frenetic activities were a product of its lack of mission 
and fear of becoming irrelevant. On the other hand, these activities were both needed and 
fell well within the military’s tradition of civic action and desire to maintain its traditional 
clientele in the countryside.”217 El Salvador’s defense white paper dated September 
1998—the current white paper on file with the U.S. State Department—details the 
FAES’s commitment to development and social programs and is titled “La Nación 
Salvadoreña: Su Defensa, Seguridad y Desarrollo” (“The Salvadoran Nation: Your 
Defense, Security, and Development”).218 A 2013 report categorizes the missions of the 
FAES as public security and institutional order, while the functions of the FAES in its 
domestic mission as equal part police, fireman, and social worker.219 
The Salvadoran military has done a great deal to improve its public image since 
the civil war. Ironically, the public support for the military’s domestic mission soared as 
the FMLN took office and President Funes more than doubled their numbers. Even 
amidst mounting reports by the citizenry of human rights violations at the hands of 
Salvadoran soldiers in 2011 and 2012, the FAES still maintain a much higher level of 
public support than does the PNC.220 Sadly enough, the gains in popularity of the armed 
forces has more to do with the general level of fear and insecurity, and that the 
                                                 
217 Walter and Williams, “Military and Democratization,” 73. 
218 El Salvador Ministry of Defense, La Nación Salvadoreña: Su Defensa, Seguridad y Desarrollo 
(San Salvador: Ministry of Defense, 1998). 
219 “Report on the Security Sector,” 38–40. 
220 “Situación de la Seguridad,” 95. 
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Salvadoran government is taking positive steps to address the problem. For instance, in 
2011, 76.4 percent of the Salvadoran population was preoccupied with rising crime 
rates.221 Just as confidence in the ability of the PNC to maintain public security waned, 
the FAES received a ringing endorsement of public opinion between 2009 and 2012 at an 
average level of above 40 percent.222 
Yet these gains in popularity in no way compare to the traditional grassroots 
network the military once had. Rather, many Salvadoran citizens have been pulled into 
the orbit of gang membership and crime. In a profile of Salvadoran gangs in 2008, Wolf 
asserts the following: 
Despite a generally greater geographical dispersion, gangs continue to be 
concentrated in the marginal communities of the capital and the 
municipalities of Apopa, Soyapango, Ilopango, and Mejicanos. Gang 
youths in these areas are predominantly male and come from low-income, 
dysfunctional families. The average entry age is between eleven and 
fifteen years, but members are now largely young adults rather than 
adolescents. Most have only intermediate levels of education and left 
school just prior to or after joining the gang.223 
The gangs of El Salvador possess a military quality in their organization, their 
ability to extract value, and their willingness to employ violence as a coercive measure. 
Estimated gang members certainly have grown in size comparable to the military. In 
2004, El Salvador had an estimated 8,714 gang members.224 By 2009, that number had 
grown to 17,000, an unprecedented 7,000 of these in Salvadoran prisons.225 Figures 9 and 
10 demonstrate that although El Salvador shares the gang problem with Honduras and 
Guatemala in terms of gang population size, the percentage of the population that belongs 
to a gang is over twice as high in El Salvador. 
                                                 
221 “Situación de la Seguridad,” 94. 
222 Derived from table in “Situación de la Seguridad,” 94–5. 
223 Sonja Wolf, “Street Gangs of El Salvador,” in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central 
America, ed. Thomas Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University Press, 
2011), 47. 
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Figure 9. Mara membership in the Northern Triangle, 2012226 
 
Figure 10. Gang members per 100,000 individuals, 2012227 
Although these youths have not received the same military training of their fathers 
and grandfathers, they are equipped with many of their same firearms and are ready to 
use them with the same ferocity. In 2012, gang related violence in Latin America 
                                                 
226 Data from law enforcement interviews, found in “Transnational Organized Crime in Central 
America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment,” UNODC, Vienna: United Nations Publishing, 2012, 
29. 
227 “Transnational Organized Crime,” 29. 
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accounted for 30 percent of total homicides.228 In 2014, gang-related homicides in El 
Salvador accounted for 50 percent of the total.229 Even though the statistics for gang-
related violence are high, Wolf is careful put the maras’ and pandillas’ tendency toward 
violence into perspective: “Decades of authoritarianism and the subsequent civil war 
normalized the use of aggression among large parts of society, not just among gang 
members.”230 
C. ANALYZING TRENDS IN MILITARIZATION 
From this brief survey of militarization in El Salvador, a few general trends may 
be observed. First, as a consequence of the history of El Salvador as a commodity 
producing country, as Paige notes, the social and economic structures “were shaped by a 
single commodity: coffee.”231 The enduring legacy of this commodities market is replete 
with outcomes, chiefly among them the necessity of the elites and the state to collude and 
produce a corrective apparatus capable of maintaining the unequal status quo. More to the 
point, the connection the state had with its people was not specifically democratic with 
the vote, nor was it welfare-based with social programs; the Salvadoran state identified 
itself as and communicated through the Salvadoran Army and its various outcroppings in 
government. 
The second significant trend of Salvadoran militarization—partly a result of the 
aforementioned trend—is the cultural identification with military organizations and 
structures. The first military dictatorship of President Hernández Martínez was forged in 
the fires of confrontation with the state: leftists seeking land reform and conservative 
elites—supported by the military. The resulting purge of at least eight to ten thousand 
people, La Matanza, served as a reminder that El Salvador was white and black: the 
                                                 
228 “Latin America: Regional Overview,” 6. 
229 Associated Press, “El Salvador: Se acaba la tregua entre las peligrosas maras,” El Comercio, 
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peasantry is either with the state, or against it.232 During the turbulent years of the Cold 
War, society again polarized. Those seeking land reform and greater social equity found 
no official outlet for their cries; those who spoke up were often silenced by the state 
security apparatus. Thus, the FMLN took up arms and fled into the jungle as guerrilla 
outlaws chasing Castro’s revolution. The polarization of the Salvadoran people only 
intensified as the coercive actions of the Salvadoran state increased. The record violence 
of the late 1970s precipitated a military coup followed by civil war. The condition of civil 
war necessitates the bulk of society to relate to military organizations of one form or 
another, either by membership or by compliance or defiance to military rule. 
More recently, I argue, the virtual war between the gangs in El Salvador, and the 
collateral damage this has inflicted on Salvadoran society, has polarized society and 
pushed many to choose sides. Many Salvadorans have chosen the gangs; still more have 
had the decision forced upon them. For instance, a shop owner extorted by a gang may 
not necessarily be in favor of said gang, but is certainly complicit in its criminal activity. 
A family that is being supported by a gang member is drawn into protection of that gang 
member, as both a son or daughter and a breadwinner. These peripheral relationships 
with gangs formed out of fear come in varying degrees of strength, but one message is 
very clear: keep the authorities out.233  As PNC officers patrol crime scenes wearing ski 
masks for their own protection while mara gang members flaunt their elaborate tattoos 
for all to see, it is no challenge to divine which side might be coming out ahead. Those 
caught in the middle must adapt to a new tension of silence. Many have been 
massacred—and continue to be—as lessons to what happens to those who talk. 
Salvadoran gangs have resorted to mutilating or decapitating their victims as a way to 
ensure societal permissiveness and a general level of terror.234 The militarization of El 
Salvador has continued to bifurcate society such that militant groups use violence as a 
means to an end. As in the case of the gang truce in 2012, the gangs even rose in 
prominence enough to negotiate with the state. The resulting pact formation that comes 
                                                 
232 Estimated death toll provided in Stanley, Protection Racket State, 42. 
233 Wolf, “Street Gangs of El Salvador,” 55. 
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from these violent standoffs yields organizational autonomy, a trait very similar to the 
historic modus operandi of the FAES. 
The third general trend taken from this survey of Salvadoran militarization is 
more apparent in that it has a physical manifestation: guns. In the Americas, according to 
UNODC statistics reported in 2013, 66 percent of all murders are committed using 
firearms; this figure is 61 percent higher than the global average to give some context.235 
Table 7 illustrates the use of firearms in homicides from 2005–2012. 
Table 7. Homicides with firearms as a percentage of total homicides in El Salvador, 
2005–2012236 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% Firearms 77 78 80 67 76 73 70 62 
 
Many of these firearms are derelicts of the civil war: M-16s and AK-47s.237 The 
presence of a robust drug trafficking network through Central America has elevated of 
other illicit flows to include firearms. Table 8 illustrates the massive inflows of firearms 
into El Salvador from 2006 to 2011. 
Table 8. Number of firearms entering El Salvador, 2006–2011238 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of 
firearms 6,332 8,611 12,225 23,324 35,575 25,151 
 
                                                 
235 Figures taken from table in “Global Study on Homicide 2013,” 16. 
236 Data from the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends, found in Table 8.3 of “Global Study on 
Homicide 2013,” 141. 
237 Wolf, “Street Gangs of El Salvador,” 53. Also see “Transnational Organized Crime,” 59. 
238 Data from the El Salvador División de Armas y explosivos de la PNC y Ministerio de la Defensa, 
found in “Situación de la Seguridad,” 17. 
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Most import firearms are pistols legally purchased from the United States. While military 
rifles have not undergone revolutionary changes since the end of the Cold War, demand 
for their purchase does not match the much wider influx of handguns.239 The UNODC 
Threat Assessment of Transnational Organized Crime in Central America identifies the 
real impetus of the firearms market in the region: 
Rather, the problem is leakage. Guns leak from licit civilian use to illicit 
use. They leak from licit military and police use to illicit use. And they 
leak across borders, in every conceivable direction240 
While it is true that guns do not kill people, as the saying goes, the mass 
proliferation of firearms in El Salvador has facilitated at least one part of a murderer’s 
task. Moreover, the tradition of firearms in the home and on the streets has accustomed 
the average Salvadoran citizen to the very real specter of violence in everyday scenarios, 
while at the same time desensitizing a younger generation of Salvadorans to the presence 
of firearms.241 Partly as a result, more than a third of Salvadorans have alleged to be 
victim to robbery or assault during their lifetime.242 Additionally, large arsenals are useful 
as long as there are armies to wield them. The maras and pandillas of El Salvador have a 
very real demand for such weapons, and they are all the stronger for having this resource 
in spades. 
Finally, the proliferation of firearms in El Salvador has elevated the stakes for the 
players involved. Gang members have abandoned their previous predilection for knives 
or other weapons for commercial and military firearms.243 That said 2010–2012 saw an 
upsurge in the percentage of murders committed with knives.244 The arsenal and level of 
violence demonstrated on the part of criminals has either prompted, or been the result 
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of—chicken or the egg—the weaponry utilized by the state. The PNC and Salvadoran 
soldiers patrol San Salvador with semi-automatic rifles and grenades. Another stark 
statistic, further attesting to the public’s lack of confidence in the state to provide security 
against the domestic criminal menace, in 2013 the number of private security employees 
in El Salvador totaled 28,639, 30 percent larger than the PNC and 370 percent larger than 
the FAES assigned to the internal security mission that year.245 
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V. IMPLICATIONS ON SALVADORAN POLICY 
Twenty years after the end of the Salvadoran Civil War, El Salvador has made 
dramatic strides in terms of consolidating as a democracy and reinventing a society that 
had known repressive military rule since the Great Depression. Yet the presidency of 
Mauricio Funes, 2009–2014, indicates some of the shortcomings in that process. This 
chapter first considers the intersection of civil-military relations and militarization in El 
Salvador; I argue that security policy formation is the connection. This chapter next 
considers the current trends in civil-military relations and militarization in El Salvador, 
and evaluates a couple of specific cases from 2009–2014 in which these trends have had 
implications. The first case, that of General David Munguía Payés, illustrates how high 
level state security policy—the rapid inflation of the FAES in the internal security role—
was formulated and instituted in a non-democratic manner, underlying a weak Salvadoran 
civil-military structure. The second case, the gang truce of 2012, examines how the Funes 
Administration covertly pursued an unpopular national strategy with unknown and 
untested implications. 
A. SECURITY POLICY FORMATION 
While there is no ready-made template from which to accurately capture civil-
military relationships from country to country, the CCMR’s trinity provides an excellent 
launching point to begin quantifying and qualifying the civil-military environment. I have 
found that El Salvador indeed meets many of the metrics established in the trinity, 
including effectiveness with their external mission; budgetary and manpower efficiency 
metrics; and policy enactment, defining objectives, and formulating defense policy. 
Despite these areas of success, El Salvador lacks in several important areas, including a 
lack of effectiveness coping with their larger internal security mission; shortcomings 
within their ministry of defense, including a dearth of civilian involvement, limited 
division of power amongst the services, and a poor buffer to the source of executive 
civilian power; and, finally, poor oversight mechanisms. These weak areas highlight the 
road El Salvador must travel to improve civil-military relations within the country. 
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At least on the face of it, democratic civilian control has been achieved in El 
Salvador. Certainly the peaceful transfer of power from the ARENA Party to the FMLN 
party in 2009 is a positive sign of the maturing democracy of El Salvador, but more to the 
point for this argument, a good auger for positively trending civil-military relations. Yet a 
closer look at some of the peculiar inner workings of military-executive relations during 
the Funes Administration indicates some weakness. 
Militarization in El Salvador has perhaps a more enduring legacy than poor 
tradition of civil-military relations. For instance, civil-military relations affect the 
populace through state policy generation: where it comes from, what laws are enacted, 
how involved the military is within El Salvador. Militarization, however, is the living 
echo of military activity that has historically reached down to the lowliest peasants in the 
countryside. 
There exists a link between civil-military relations and militarization, and the 
connection seems to be where policy formation affects the internal security mission of El 
Salvador. I have already identified the internal mission of El Salvador’s military to be a 
significantly weak competency in the category of effectiveness. Salvadoran civilian and 
military leaders have yet to come up with a consistent strategy with which to reduce the 
levels of domestic violence that plague the country. The gang truce of 2012, disregarding 
the manner in which it was conducted, seemed to be one innovative method that 
temporarily reduced the homicide rate within the country, but only served as a stop-gap 
measure. 
The FAES—whether by abuse as a political promise to the people or their desire 
to regain former prominence in the sector of internal security—has also increased its 
presence greatly within San Salvador and other violent departments of the country. The 
military has taken on, by way of supplementing the ailing PNC with manpower, 
hardware, and tactics, a significant and seemingly permanent security competency, one 
not seen since Salvadoran soldiers patrolled the streets during the civil war. Salvadoran 
internal defense policy has led to a militarization of the PNC. At the same time, the use of 
the FAES as a campaign promise as the silver bullet to improve citizen security by the 
FMLN has politicized the FAES. I study two cases in more depth in the following 
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sections to illustrate the connection I believe exists between civil-military relations and 
militarization in El Salvador. 
B. CASE ANALYSIS: A PRESIDENT AND HIS ARMY 
President Mauricio Funes demonstrated some level of role confusion as to his 
most senior and controversial military leader. Retired Colonel David Munguía Payés—
allegedly sympathetic to the left and cashiered by the ARENA Party—was brought out of 
retirement to lead the Ministry of Defense as a general when President Funes took office 
in 2009. In June 2011, Payés publicly retired from active duty causing some debate as to 
whether he was preparing to run for the presidency. Two years later, in November 2011, 
Funes placed Payés as Minister of Justice and Security. In May 2012, shortly after the 
gang truce scandal broke, El Salvador’s tenacious Supreme Court ruled Payés as unfit for 
the position; the court ruled that his credentials as a retired military officer—as well as 
those of PNC director General Francisco Salinas—were inconsistent with the ideals of 
public security laid out in the 1992 peace accords. Incidentally, Payés’ replacement by 
Ricardo Perdomo, ardent critic of gang mediation, hampered any further negotiations and 
led to an overnight upsurge in homicides. After a few months as presidential advisor to 
President Funes, Payés was again installed in the post of minister of Defense in July 
2013. While he serves in that post as a retired military officer, Payés continues to wear 
the uniform and serve in his former military capacity.246 Many thought the election of 
Sánchez Cerén would result in Payés’ ouster, considering his controversial reputation, but 
Payés remained on in the military’s top position.247 In June 2014, Attorney General Luis 
Martínez, another harsh critic of the gang negotiations, announced a probe into recent 
attacks against PNC and FAES officers by gang members with military grade firearms, 
singling out General Payés as being investigated for his involvement.248 Shortly after, 
President Cerén publicly asked Martínez to continue his investigation into Payés’ 
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involvement, but to be careful to not make any accusations until all the facts are 
known.249 Farah speculates that “there was a general feeling that if [Cerén] cut ties with 
Munguía Payés immediately, it would ignite an even more significant wave of gang 
violence.”250 Regardless, the case has been out of the press for at least six months since. 
 
Figure 11. Salvadoran Minister of Defense General David Munguía Payés251 
The curious case of General Payés highlights many shortcomings in the structure 
of both the military and civilian leadership from 2009–2014. It is clear that the FMLN 
civilian leadership has control over the appointment of high ranking officers, having 
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250 Douglas Farah, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, quoted in 
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shuffled Payés in and out of retirement into high profile positions. Yet this control hardly 
seems democratic. There was no legislative oversight into Payés’ appointment as 
Minister of Defense in 2009, Minister of Justice and Security in 2011, and again Minister 
of Defense in 2013. Additionally, the state apparatus did not operate in unison regarding 
the direction the FMLN leadership chose; the actions of both Attorney General Luis 
Martínez and Minister of Justice and Security Ricardo Perdomo seem contrary to Funes’ 
policy of having the government serve as a mediator with the gangs. 
This case also indicates some weaknesses within the military as well. Although 
the military maintains some level of autonomy, they seem to have no institutional control 
as to who rises up through the ranks and is ready to serve in their top billets. Payés, under 
Funes’ direction, greatly expanded the role of soldiers on the streets. The introduction of 
almost 10,000 Salvadoran soldiers to the role of internal security since the FMLN took 
power is a significant uptick in militarization. President Funes stated that “we are 
engaged in a new war, a new fight against a scourge that threatens national sovereignty 
[and that] these new enemies are strongly-armed criminal gangs, economically powerful 
organizations that operate in our territory as well as in all the region of Central 
America.”252 With the addition of thousands of FAES soldiers and such strong political 
rhetoric, one might hope for a clear, coherent, transparent, and democratic policy for their 
use. Presidential Decree Number 52, in effect since May 2013, states that the FAES will 
support the PNC to maintain internal peace, plan and execute operations against criminal 
gangs, and conduct joint patrols to dissuade criminal violence.253 
Outside of a few official statements, however, Salvadorans are left to wonder the 
direction of national security. The PNC, the force responsible for internal security under 
the peace accords, has been undercut by FAES involvement. In an unhappy irony, the 
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budget for the increase in the number of Salvadoran soldiers patrolling San Salvador and 
other violent zones of the country has come out of the PNC’s budget.254 And while the 
public shows much higher confidence levels in the FAES than the PNC (Figure 12), 
public support has waned since 2011 owing partly to mounting reports of mistreatment, 
summary executions, and human rights violations at the hands of the FAES (Table 9). 
The FAES are now highly politicized arbiters who interact with the public daily. 
Sotomayor argues using the armed forces creates an insecurity dilemma in that violence 
spikes and the professionalism of the armed forces is thus challenged by the 
countervailing pressures of corruption and intimidation—particularly disconcerting in El 
Salvador, which has a dark military history.255 Unfortunately, due to the secretive manner 
in which the policy has been formulated, and the politicization of General Payés’ role as 
secret arbiter of the gang truce—now with possible criminal charges pending—throws 
into question all FAES activity within El Salvador. 
 
Figure 12. Percent public support for the PNC and FAES, 2001–2012256 
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255 Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico,” 50, 54. 
256 Data provided by IUDOP, found in “Situación de la Seguridad,” 95. 
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Table 9. Human rights complaints leveled against the FAES,  
2009–2012257 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Reports 57 215 363 237 
 
Academics have closely followed El Salvador’s development. In 2005, during the 
conservative ARENA presidency of Antonio Saca, Bruneau summarized El Salvador’s 
case: “In sum, there is awareness and overall movement in the right direction of qualified 
civilians assuming control, but the creation of an institutional basis is difficult and 
slow.”258 That same year, Pion-Berlin asserted that “not even a hint is present that they 
have any interest in [democratic civilian control].”259 In 2013, Martínez alleged that El 
Salvador had a long way to go in terms of removing the military from areas of 
administration and developing an appropriate level of legislative oversight.260 Judging 
from the case of General Payés and the ramping up of FAES involvement in the country, 
El Salvador is still searching for the appropriate level of institutionalized military 
participation in government. 
C. CASE ANALYSIS: NEGOTIATING WITH MURDERERS 
Much like the undemocratic manner in which President Funes and his top general 
shaped state security policy, the gang truce of 2012 emerged amidst scandal and denial—
unfortunately the end of which is still unknown. Before coming to the truce, I will first 
describe the circumstances that led the state to consider negotiating with murderers. 
In response to mounting crime levels at the turn of the century, the conservative 
ARENA presidencies of Francisco Flores (1999-2004) and Antonio Saca (2004-2009) 
unrolled mano dura and super mano dura programs. Ungar suggests these policies “are 
popular, easy to formulate and enact, and the best guarantee for quick results during a 
                                                 
257 Data provided by the Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights in El Salvador; found in 
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limited time in office.”261 Moreover, mano dura yields results in terms of arrests and 
seizures very quickly, and so gains popular support in the short term.262 For example, 
fulfilling his campaign promise, President Saca enabled the police to arrest approximately 
14,000 Salvadoran youths from 2004–2005.263 The approach failed to mitigate the 
conditions that spawn more gang members, and in fact worsened the domestic insecurity 
of the state: prison overcrowding, innocent youths who join the gangs while in prison, 
and the overall cheapening of Salvadoran human rights—particularly among the young 
male population. 
Public security crises typically force electoral battles into wedge issues.264 In 2009 
the FMLN battled ARENA over the issue of mano dura, asserting that the policy had 
worsened public insecurity and that innovative grassroots prevention and rehabilitation 
policies were required. While the FMLN won the election, President Mauricio Funes 
faced stark difficulties implementing the FMLN’s vision. The FMLN’s social programs 
failed to yield immediate results as they were institutional reforms for a long-term 
strategy. Under this level of scrutiny, President Funes abandoned his social programs in 
favor of a more expeditious solution. Cannon asserts that “Funes not only revived, but 
surpassed right-wing policies on violence, despite their previous ineffectiveness, and 
single-handedly ‘decided the return of the military to politics.’”265 
As already discussed, Funes dramatically increased the numbers of troops to 
supplement the PNC mission. And while many of those imprisoned under earlier mano 
dura regimes had been released due to lack of evidence, the prison populations remained 
high under Funes. Additionally, conditions of Salvadoran prisons have been notoriously 
bad. In 2013, El Salvador maintained 19 prisons with a capacity of 8,110 adults.266 
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Considering the total prison population presented in Table 10 and Figure 13, Salvadoran 
prisons are well-over their capacity. Along with overcrowding, many inmates, men and 
women, live in subhuman conditions. The trend in prison overcrowding and poor 
conditions is a problem throughout Latin America, though perhaps most acute in El 
Salvador.267 
Table 10. Number and percent of the prison population, 2005–2013268 




2005 11,894 95.2 600 4.8 12,494 
2008 17,496 93 1,315 7 18,811 
2009 19,328 91.9 1,704 8.1 21,032 
2010 21,700 90.6 2,260 9.4 23,960 
2011 23,055 90.5 2,416 9.5 25,471 
2012 24,386 90.2 2,647 9.8 27,033 
2013 24,324 90.6 2,524 9.4 26,848 
 
 
Figure 13. Gang population imprisoned, 2003–2013269 
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With the stage thus set—a lack of clear leadership under President Funes, an 
innovative moment for initiative of the left, public pressure to get something done, and 
the gangs having a political gripe with the state—the 2012 gang truce stealthily  
materialized. It was only after a Salvadoran paper, Elfaro.net, investigated the sudden 
plunge of homicides in March 2012 and pressured to the Funes Administration to 
comment that any of the facts became known. The paper confirmed that some 30 
members of the top leadership of both Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18 had been 
transferred from maximum security lockup to lower security facilities with laxer 
visitation and cell phone restrictions. In exchange, reporters confirmed with several gang 
leaders on the street that they had received orders from their criminal superiors to avoid 
murder in order to facilitate further negotiations with the state.270 A few days after the 
report, then Minister of Justice and Security General David Munguía Payés, confirmed 
that certain members had been relocated, but this was the result of intelligence received 
of an upcoming breakout attempt. President Funes denied all prior knowledge.271 Finally, 
in September 2012, General Payés acknowledged that the government sought the help of 
former guerrillero and political leader Raúl Mijango and Monsignor Fabio Colindres, 
head of the Military Bishopric in El Salvador, to negotiate terms of a truce between the 
two most violent gangs in El Salvador.272 Payés claimed that the truce was arranged 
under Funes’ explicit authorization. Funes denied any knowledge of arranging the truce, 
but was quick to admit that the government, owing to the benefits obtained from the 
truce—the hundreds or thousands of living people that may presumably have ended up as 
homicide statistics without the truce—the government of El Salvador would facilitate 
further negotiations. After all, the truce yielded results that mano dura could not: in a 
little over a year, the average homicide rate dropped from 14 murders per day to 5.5 
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murders in May 2013.273 The governments and gangs of Guatemala and Honduras took 
notice of the truce in El Salvador; the two main gangs in Honduras agreed to a truce in 
May of 2013.274 
Many facts are unknown about the particulars of the formation of the gang truce, 
but the ensuing scandal revealed political rifts within President Funes’ administration, to 
include his relationship with his chief military advisor, General Payés. Whether Funes 
consented to the full scope of the gang truce beforehand or no, the manner in which the 
administration released the facts at least reveals an inappropriate level of national security 
management. Bruneau states that the recent truce signaled “the importance of political 
variables, and specifically the extent and coherence of the security sector as an aspect of 
state presence”275 In the case of the truce, I argue that political variables undercut a 
coherent security response, and weakened the credibility of the Salvadoran national 
security policy process. 
Pion-Berlin claims that informal civil-military relations occurs when “civilian 
officer holders and military personnel alike move ‘off script,’ taking liberties with the 
rules and finding other venues in which to deliberate.”276 As the argument goes—at least 
in the ideal—official civil-military interactions are conducted in official venues and in the 
spirit of democratic transparency. It is possible that President Funes, if he did explicitly 
authorize the truce, realized that admitting to negotiating with gang members—mass 
murderers—would incite conservative criticism and public backlash. General Payés 
admitted as much, claiming the country would have destroyed him had they known what 
the inner circle was really up to.277 The informal networking that occurred to enlist 
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Mijango and Colindres on behalf of the Salvadoran government conforms to Pion-
Berlin’s model in which the civilians initiate bilateral informal discussions in order to 
resolve a contentious issue.278 
Regardless of how the meetings initiated, national security policy was formulated 
in an inherently undemocratic way—again. While the success of the gang truce yielded 
immediate results, the long term impact has yet to be realized. Many are concerned that 
by negotiating with the gangs, they have been elevated in prominence and sophistication 
as political actors. Farah remarks that the government of El Salvador quickly fell hostage 
to the gangs: 
[The gangs] believe the balance of power is now in their favor because the 
government, unwilling to risk a return to high levels of violence, has only 
to be threatened with more violence in order to grant more concessions to 
groups that have terrorized the country for more than a decade. This has 
already led to more concessions than were made known in the earlier 
talks.279 
Those on the political right and members of the ARENA Party have been asking exactly 
what promises have been made to the gangs. In January 2014, Representative Roberto 
d’Aubuisson accused the Funes Administration for arranging the truce in March 2012, 
but also for having used funds from the prison budget to bribe both gang members and 
their families to maintain the truce.280 Salvadoran Attorney General Luis Martínez, an 
outspoken critic of negotiating with the gangs, confirmed these transactions in a probe 
released in March 2014.281 
In El Salvador, the policy of negotiating with gangs was a political gambit, 
whether as a well-laid plan or a stop-gap measure, the truce bought the FMLN time to 
implement some of their social programs. But in the end, it may have just served as a 
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political expedient, just as mano dura policies did under ARENA’s leadership. Sadly for 
El Salvador, if the elevation of gangs into the political realm proves dangerous, it will be 
the fault of a few who made back room deals. Indeed, towards the end of his presidency, 
Funes began to reduce his levels of commitment to gang mediation.282 As the gangs have 
perceived the government to be uncooperative, and with the replacement of Ricardo 
Perdomo as Minister of Security—another known critic of the negotiations—the gang 
truce collapsed and the homicide rates again surged.283 According to a recent PNC 
disclosure, the end of November 2014 saw 3,429 homicides for the year compared to 
2,490 in 2012; hopeful in the report, though, the PNC reported that the rate of daily 
homicides is down from earlier in the year (11 per day vice 13 per day).284 Regardless, 
the spike towards the close of Funes’ presidency has led many of his critics to believe 
that negotiating with the gangs indeed made them more powerful. For example, since the 
breakdown of the truce, the gangs have now opted for a strategy of attacking PNC and 
FAES officers directly.285 
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Figure 14. President Sanchez Cerén swearing in on 1 June 2014.286 
The election of Sánchez Cerén, former FMLN guerrilla leader, prompted 
questions about El Salvador’s future course. Would the election result in a rift with the 
United States in the fight against narcotrafficking? an alignment with Latin America’s 
Left? In terms of security, however, Cerén’s initial months in office have indicated a 
higher level of coherent civilian ownership of security policy formation. So far President 
Sánchez Cerén has distanced himself from the truce negotiations and continued with 
Funes’ prevention and rehabilitation programs. In August of 2014, leaders of Mara 
Salvatrucha and Calle 18 publicly called on the Cerén Administration to resume truce 
mediation, offering to cease their attacks on the police and the military. Cerén replied that 
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he recognized no gang truce and would formulate his own security strategy.287 He has 
instated the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia (CNSCC), which 
is a combination of a working group and a national security council. The council has met 
three times since its inception in September and consists of important actors across El 
Salvador: church leaders, business leaders, local governors, the attorney general, political 
party representatives, subject matter experts, members of the press, and, of course, the 
president himself.288 The only apparently questionable move on Cerén’s part has been the 
retention of General Payés as Minister of Defense, still a lightning rod for unwanted 
attention as the Ministry of Justice continues to investigate President Funes’ handling of 
the 2012 gang truce.  
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This thesis argues that El Salvador under the leadership of FMLN President 
Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) witnessed suboptimal ideal civil-military relations and 
increasing trend in militarization. El Salvador in the 20th century experienced an 
uninterrupted 70 years of authoritarian military rule from 1932—1979. This period of 
rule culminated in a civil war that strained the military’s relationship with both the 
government and society. Salvadorans ready for peace signed the 1992 Chapultepec Peace 
Accords and allowed the United Nations to mediate the process of demobilization. 
Among the successes of the peace process were the demobilization and disarmament of 
the FMLN, the reduction of the FAES, the disbandment of former state security and 
intelligence services, the formation of the PNC, and the investigation of human rights 
violations. Yet the peace did not go far enough in reintegrating former combatants back 
into society, recovering the economy, and coping with rising security challenges.289 
First among security challenges in democratic El Salvador has been the rise of 
domestic insecurity by way of transnational gangs and the drug trade. As a result, security 
policy formation has remained a highly contentious issue. In the 2000s, the conservative 
ARENA party unrolled mano dura policies that only exacerbated the security problem: 
hardened the gangs, crammed the prisons, and eroded due process and civil rights. After 
their consecutive failures, the middle-of-the-road FMLN candidate and former 
newscaster Mauricio Funes won the public’s support for a different approach to crime. 
Funes delivered a massive increase to the numbers of troops on the streets in order to 
reinforce the ailing PNC and deter criminal activity generally. He increased the presence 
of the FAES involved in internal security from 1,975 in 2009 to 11,200 effectives by 
2014.290 
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During the Funes Administration, this thesis assesses that civil-military relations 
did not conform to the CCMR “trinity” model that considers effectiveness, efficiency, 
and democratic civilian control. While the FAES has demonstrated a noted ability to 
perform its external mission in deterring aggression and participating in multinational 
peacekeeping operations around the world, its domestic mission, as laid out in Salvadoran 
military strategy, has not yet succeeded in restoring citizen security. The FAES is highly 
efficient in the use of its resources in terms of both manpower and budget. Perhaps the 
weakest area of the trinity for El Salvador is that of democratic civilian control; despite 
the legislature’s ability to enact policy, define objectives, and formulate defense policy, 
lawmakers fail to adequately oversee the FAES agenda. Additionally, the MOD lacks 
almost all qualifiers for healthy civil-military relations: it is not civilianized, does not 
manage defense objectives, does not organize and equip the military, does not facilitate 
organizational distance from the executive, and fails to create competition among the 
military services within the FAES. In sum, while El Salvador may possess the most 
progressive civil-military relationship in Central America, there is room for 
improvement. 
Militarization in El Salvador is a persistent theme throughout its history. While 
the grassroots network that connected the military to the serving population fractured 
during the civil war, the prevalence of Salvadoran troops in the lives of everyday 
Salvadorans has not diminished. Outside of the sheer size of the force that patrols San 
Salvador and some of the more violent zones of the state, the visual manifestation of their 
presence is very prominent in the media. When President Funes originally pledged the 
FAES to internal security, public approval skyrocketed, but as the years wore on, there is 
little evidence to show that more troops has reduced crime or given the PNC room to 
recuperate. Indeed, the PNC today is rocked by one corruption scandal after the next 
while the FAES patrolling are at record numbers. Meanwhile the legacy of El Salvador’s 
history of militarization has led to the polarization of Salvadoran society between crime 
and government, identification with and desensitization to violence, and a surplus of 
military training and firearms to be used by other nefarious organizations. 
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The connection between civil-military relations and militarization in El Salvador 
has been security policy formation. Whether conducted in a somewhat transparent 
manner in official venues or privately and undemocratically, state policy on the question 
of citizen security dramatically affects the lives of Salvadorans. Two specific cases under 
President Funes’ leadership stand out. In the first case, President Funes maintained a 
questionable connection to his chief military advisor, General David Munguía Payés. 
Payés occupied various positions during the Funes Administration; he was pulled out of 
retirement to serve as Minister of Defense, then was appointed as Minister of Justice and 
Security, and when the legislature overturned his appointment, Payés served as a private 
military advisor to Funes before finally being restored to the post of Minister of 
Defense—a post he occupies to this day. President Funes and General Payés orchestrated 
the involvement of the FAES in the public security sphere largely in private with very 
little consultation of the legislature or the military. 
The second case involves the gang truce of 2012. The government, via General 
Payés’ emissaries, secretly sought a negotiated peace with imprisoned Salvadoran gang 
leaders in order to bring the homicide rate down. When the murder rate dropped at 
alarming levels, a newspaper revealed that the government had indeed negotiated with 
murderers. Although Funes has denied any involvement with its design, the truce 
validated itself by keeping homicide levels down for over a year and a half. President 
Funes’ government worked to further negotiations with gang leaders and replicate it 
success, but ultimately failed when opposition forces within the government began 
investigating what promises had been pledged to the gangsters—an investigation that is 
still making headlines. 
In sum, while El Salvador has made notable gains in civil-military relations, there 
is still room for abuse of the national security process. Such abuses, as in the case of the 
FAES’s  new permanent internal security role and the gang truce, the level and rate of 
militarization in Salvadoran society sadly continues to elevate. The correct course is 
admittedly difficult to find and implement. After all, what good is a democracy if it is 
overrun by criminal insecurity? President Funes, either through ignorance or design, 
consented to act nearly unilaterally on behalf of the state in order to buy time for the 
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FMLN’s liberal agenda of rehabilitation and prevention. More immediately, he acted in 
the interest of political expediency and popularity. Whether the course El Salvador is 
currently on, one of elevated troop levels on the streets and sophisticated political gangs 
that use bodies as political chips, has been worth the gamble in terms of unrolling the 
FMLN’s agenda is unknown. An early look at President Cerén’s time in office seems 
optimistic that he is committed to acting more transparently than his predecessor and 
allowing time for his social programs to improve conditions inside El Salvador while 
seeking international help in developing the region. Whether El Salvador can break its 
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